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This thesis examines the origins and consequences of U.S. security assistance in the Persian
Gulf. I argue that the American policy of creating 'regional superpowers' in the Gulf has failed to
adequately secure U.S. interests. It has had the unintended consequence of increasing /^stability.
The failure of the 'twin pillars' policy - as the Nixon Doctrine became known in the Gulf - is
evidenced by the fall of one pillar (the Shah's Iran), serious domestic troubles in the second pillar
(Saudi Arabia), and, most important, the advent of a large, continuous and direct U.S. military
presence in the Gulf. Such a U.S. presence is what the policy was designed to prevent.
Further, I offer an original interpretation of the origins of the Nixon Doctrine. Only
tangentially related to Vietnam, the Nixon Doctrine was centrally concerned with the Gulf, and in
particular with providing security resources to Iran and Saudi Arabia to safeguard U.S. interests.
The doctrine was driven as much by domestic political pressures as it was by geostrategic concerns.
In order to implement the Nixon Doctrine, the U.S. privately advocated raising international oil
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U.S. security assistance in the Persian Gulf has failed to bring stability to the region. In
fact, it may have undermined stability. The "twin pillars" policy, initiated by President Nixon's
"Guam speech" and codified in his follow-on Foreign Policy Report of 18 February 1970, was
predicated upon arms sales to Iran and Saudi Arabia to stabilize the region. The Islamic revolution
in Iran pointed out fundamental weaknesses in the policy, both in terms of its effect upon target
regimes and U.S. adaptation to this setback, yet the surrogate strategy's legacy of mass arms sales
continues in modified form today; this bodes ill for the future of the region.
I argue that the sale of arms to states in the Gulf region does not guarantee their security; it
actually hastens instability. Unfortunately, the present policy is seductive in the short term; the
benefits are indeed manifold, albeit illusory. Despite occasional mishaps, U.S. access to oil has
remained steady, the hostile designs of both Iran and Iraq have been contained, and the Persian
Gulf is in essence an American lake. Most states in the region vie to become a U.S. ally. One
cannot argue with the resultant benefits; but in the long term, this policy may prove to be
deleterious. History has shown that alliances and loyalties shift rapidly in the region: the presence
of oil makes the situation even more volatile.
I examine U.S. security assistance to the Persian Gulf region from 1950, concentrating on
the cases of Iran and Saudi Arabia from 1 970 to the present. This roughly coincides with the
Nixon Doctrine period; I will cover both the factors and assumptions that brought President Nixon
to his decision, and the repercussions of it in the Persian Gulf. I contend that U.S. arms sales to the
Shah hastened his overthrow, and that the same pattern is emerging (albeit in lesser form) in Saudi
Arabia. Further, I argue that U.S. arms transfer policy in the Gulfwas driven as much by
ix
economic concerns (that is, the military-industrial complex in President Eisenhower's famous
phrase) as by strategic concerns. In fact, the Nixon Doctrine was not merely a clarion call to
remove U.S. troops from Vietnam; rather, it was a premeditated move to shift foreign policy
toward utilizing Iran to replace Great Britain and maintain U.S. interests (primarily Soviet
containment) in the Gulf. The evidence indicates unprecedented U.S. cooperation in raising oil
prices in order to allow Iran and Saudi Arabia to purchase technologically advanced weapons
systems in their new role as "regional superpowers" safeguarding U.S. interests; after the Shah's
overthrow, the United States has taken a direct role in the Persian Gulf, and the surrogate strategy
has been overridden by the need to safeguard Saudi oil supplies. Finally, I will argue that a policy
which incorporates explicit U.S. defense guarantees for the Gulf Cooperation Council states,
combined with selective basing rights and forward deployed forces in the region, is a more
effective means of pursuing U.S. interests in the Gulf.
The thesis is divided into five chapters: chapter one examines U.S. arms transfer policy
prior to the Nixon Doctrine, and the effects which the Kennedy and Johnson administrations'
policy had upon the U.S. arms industry and U.S. security concerns. Chapter two is an examination
of the Nixon Doctrine, and specifically the policy concerns which it was meant to address.
Chapters three and four will discuss Iran and Saudi Arabia, respectively, and their roles in U.S.
policy (primarily as the well-known "Twin Pillars"). Finally, Chapter five will discuss the
repercussions of the Nixon Doctrine on the Persian Gulf today, and methods to bring about greater
stability in the area.
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U.S. security assistance in the Persian Gulf has failed to bring stability to the
region. In fact, it may have undermined stability. The "twin pillars" policy, initiated by
President Nixon's "Guam speech" and codified in his follow-on Foreign Policy Report of
1 8 February 1 970, was predicated upon arms sales to Iran and Saudi Arabia to stabilize
the region. The Islamic revolution in Iran pointed out fundamental weaknesses in the
policy, both in terms of its effect upon target regimes and U.S. adaptation to this setback,
yet the surrogate strategy's legacy of mass arms sales continues in modified form today;
this bodes ill for the future of the region.
I argue that the sale of arms to states in the Gulf region does not guarantee their
security; it actually hastens instability. This is due to several factors: first, arms sales
alone do not qualitatively increase an army's fighting power. Without the ability to
maintain and employ these weapons on the modern battlefield, several states have
discovered that high-tech weapons are a poor substitute for basic warfighting skills.
Second, the high cost of creating a modern army carries with it the expectation that the
army will be able to fight; the ineffectual performance of well-armed forces creates
contempt for both the army and the government which it represents. Third, the expense
of purchasing modern weapons is well-publicized, and is a bone of contention to a polity
whose domestic needs are not being met. Fourth, the sale of arms to adjoining states
creates a regional arms race fueled on both sides by the United States. A combination of
these factors has in the past helped bring about popular discontent with the regime and
(rightly or wrongly) the United States which supports it.
Unfortunately, the present policy is seductive in the short term; the benefits are
indeed manifold, albeit illusory. Despite occasional mishaps, U.S. access to oil has
remained steady, the hostile designs of both Iran and Iraq have been contained, and the
Persian Gulf is in essence an American lake. Most states in the region vie to become a
U.S. ally. One cannot argue with the resultant benefits; but in the long term, this policy
may prove to be deleterious. History has shown that alliances and loyalties shift rapidly
in the region: the presence of oil makes the situation even more volatile.
I examine U.S. security assistance to the Persian Gulf region from 1950,
concentrating on the cases of Iran and Saudi Arabia from 1970 to the present. This
roughly coincides with the Nixon Doctrine period; I will cover both the factors and
assumptions that brought President Nixon to his decision, and the repercussions of it in
the Persian Gulf. I contend that U.S. arms sales to the Shah hastened his overthrow, and
that the same pattern is emerging (albeit in lesser form) in Saudi Arabia. Further, I argue
that U.S. arms transfer policy in the Gulf was driven as much by economic concerns (that
is, the military-industrial complex in President Eisenhower's famous phrase) as by
strategic concerns. In fact, the Nixon Doctrine was not merely a clarion call to remove
U.S. troops from Vietnam; rather, it was a premeditated move to shift foreign policy
toward utilizing Iran to replace Great Britain and maintain U.S. interests (primarily
Soviet containment) in the Gulf. The evidence indicates unprecedented U.S. cooperation
in raising oil prices in order to allow Iran and Saudi Arabia to purchase technologically
advanced weapons systems in their new role as "regional superpowers" safeguarding U.S.
interests; after the Shah's overthrow, the United States has taken a direct role in the
Persian Gulf, and the surrogate strategy has been overridden by the need to safeguard
Saudi oil supplies. Finally, I will argue that a policy which incorporates explicit U.S.
defense guarantees for the Gulf Cooperation Council states, combined with selective
basing rights and forward deployed forces in the region, is a more effective means of
pursuing U.S. interests in the Gulf.
The thesis is divided into five chapters: chapter one examines U.S. arms transfer
policy prior to the Nixon Doctrine, and the effects which the Kennedy and Johnson
administrations' policy had upon the U.S. arms industry and U.S. security concerns.
Chapter two is an examination of the Nixon Doctrine, and specifically the policy
concerns which it was meant to address. Chapters three and four will discuss Iran and
Saudi Arabia, respectively, and their roles in U.S. policy (primarily as the well-known
"Twin Pillars"). Finally, Chapter five will discuss the repercussions of the Nixon
Doctrine on the Persian Gulf today, and methods to bring about greater stability in the
area.

II. U.S. ARMS TRANSFERS PRIOR TO THE NIXON DOCTRINE
By the mid 1 960s, under the direction of Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara, 1 arms transfer policy began to shift from grants of surplus equipment and
selected military aid under the Military Assistance Program (MAP) to arms sales under
the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and direct commercial sales (CS) programs. Excepting
the case of South Vietnam, in a five-year period the ratio of military aid to military sales
changed dramatically: in 1961, military aid was twice as large as sales; by 1966, Foreign
Military Sales figures were twice as high as military aid. 2 Interestingly, certain regions
continued to get more MAP aid than military sales; these nations, primarily in Latin
America and the Far East, were considered counter-insurgency areas where internal
security was more important to U.S. policy-makers than external defense. As viewed by
strategists, this counter-insurgency aid implied more than the transfer of military
technology; it also implied a commitment to economic and social development in the
recipient countries. 3 To ensure this, MAP funds were complemented by large economic
1 Anthony Sampson, The Arms Bazaar (New York: The Viking Press, 1977),
115-117. Overshadowed by McNamara's Vietnam War policy was his dedication to U.S.
arms sales abroad which he called "the cash cow."
2 This brief history is explained in greater detail in Roger P. Labrie, et al, U.S.
Arms Sales Policy (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1982).
3 Michael T. Klare, American Arms Supermarket (Austin: University of Texas,
1984). Much of the section on Latin America is drawn from Chapter 5 of this source as
well.
aid programs. However, U.S. refusal in 1965 to sell advanced aircraft to Latin American
countries spurred nations in the region to diversify arms purchases and eschew U.S.
goods.
Fierce lobbying from the U.S. aerospace industry followed this loss of Latin
American markets (discussed below), in an attempt to remove the strictures on exporting
high-tech weaponry. Richard Nixon endorsed these views during his 1968 campaign.
Congress was less forthcoming, passing the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968, which
prohibited sales of sophisticated weapons systems to "developing countries." Congress
also amended the Foreign Assistance Act, requiring that aid be cut off to any country
which diverted "excessive funds" to purchase military hardware. Therefore, it is clear
that Congress recognized the deleterious effects of wholesale weapons transfers to lesser-
developed countries, and opposed such a policy.
A. ORIGINS OF THE NIXON DOCTRINE
The Nixon Administration's emphasis on arms sales did not emerge sui generis:
U.S. arms transfer policy had undergone an evolution in the decades following the
Second World War. Emerging from that conflict as the world's most powerful nation, the
United States perceived its main international challenge to be containment of the Soviet
Union. Despite this there was little consensus: several years of policy debate ensued in
the late 1 940s between proto-isolationists who wished to revert to the status quo ante
bellum; expansionists who saw U.S. strength as an opportunity to increase American
influence; and liberals who feared both camps. This ambivalence could be seen in U.S.
responses to events in Turkey and Greece, where communist threats (through civil war or
Soviet interest in the Bosphorus) were generally perceived as serious. However,
detractors in Congress called the Truman Doctrine too costly or accused the United States
of aiding reactionary states and "British imperialism" in the region.4 The situation was
similar in China, where some thought the communist menace akin to that in Greece and
Turkey, while others supported Mao Tse Tung's revolution, "mistaking it for a
predominantly agrarian reform movement representative of the aspirations of the
'common man'." 5 As late as 1950, President Truman explicitly recognized China's title to
Taiwan over great opposition in Congress. 6
Events in 1950 shook all of these camps from their torpor, beginning with the
ratification of a Sino-Soviet friendship in February and culminating in the Korean War,
which broke out in June. Congress acted quickly to pass the Mutual Security Act of 1 95
1
which gathered all previous and pertinent legislation concerning military and economic
assistance under one source. The Act's preamble stressed the complementary nature of
the different measures, and explicitly made security assistance an arm of foreign policy.
4 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), The Arms Trade with
the Third World (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1971) 139. Hereafter cited as simply
Arms Trade.
5 Arms Trade, 140.
6 Arms Trade, 140.
The Mutual Security Act of 1951 permitted grants of U.S. military equipment and
deployment of military advisory groups to foreign nations, but the conditions were rather
strict; in some aspects they appear to presage the Nixon doctrine by two decades.
Congress required that a recipient country:
1
.
Join in promoting international understanding, and good
will, and maintaining world peace.
2. Take such action as may be mutually agreed upon to
eliminate causes of international tension.
3. Fulfill the military obligations which it has assumed
under multilateral or bilateral agreements or treaties to
which the United States is a party.
4. Make consistent with its political and economic
stability, the full contribution permitted by its manpower,
resources, facilities, and general economic condition to the
development and maintenance of its own defensive strength
and the defensive strength of the free world.
5. Take all reasonable measures which may be needed to
develop its own defense capabilities.
6. Take appropriate steps to ensure the effective utilization
of the economic and military assistance provided by the
United States.7
These strictures, imposed by a Congress which found the original legislation too
lenient, were highly unpopular with the third world governments who wished to avoid the
alliances which the Act appeared to demand; difficulties ensued with the leaders of Iran,
7 Arms Trade, 157-158.
Mexico, Indonesia and Brazil. 8 This was to become a pattern: the executive branch
viewed security assistance as an integral (and often the fundamental) part of its foreign
policy, while the legislative branch, more cautious, imposed what it considered to be
reasonable restrictions on arms transfers. A compromise bill, the Mutual Security Act of
1954, erased some of these limitations of the 1951 Act, allowing the president to waive
some eligibility requirements on arms transfers, but again only under certain strict
conditions.9
During the 1950s U.S. arms policy focused upon three broad geographic zones:
these were the forward defense areas, the free world orientation areas, and Latin America.
This distinction was to figure prominently in later arms transfer debates and would
directly effect the Nixon administration. Further, the majority of U.S. arms transfers
were made under the Military Assistance Program (MAP), which transferred war surplus
equipment to recipient states; these transfers were almost entirely grants , as both the
European and Far Eastern economies had been shattered by the war, and at first could not
pay for weaponry. Interestingly, MAP funds were authorized under the Foreign
Assistance Act (rather than under defense spending) in keeping with the explicit linkage
between arms transfer and economic development in foreign policy.
The first category, the forward defense areas, encompassed those nations which
8 Arms Trade, 158.
9 Arms Trade, 159.
bordered China or the Soviet Union, and included the whole of Europe. The U.S.
commitment to these areas may be seen in Figure 1; from 1950 to 1970, the forward
defense areas received about 75 percent of total U.S. weapons exports. The major
recipients were (in millions of U.S. dollars): France ($24,029), South Korea ($15,337),
Turkey ($14,841), Taiwan ($13,059), Italy ($12, 710), Greece ($7,942) and Belgium
($7,100). 10
FIGURE l 11
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The free world orientation areas, i.e., the rest of the world excepting Latin
America, remained relatively unimportant through the 1950s in terms of arms transfers,
10 Keith Krause, Arms and the State: Patterns ofMilitary Production and Trade
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 99.
11 Arms Trade, 142.
10
as did Latin America. The United States refused to sell sophisticated equipment to these
areas due to their relative security from attack.
Until the late 1950s, U.S. security assistance efforts enjoyed widespread domestic
support. By then however, the initial mission of military aid seemed fulfilled; the
forward defense areas were secure from direct Soviet or Chinese attack, and the economy
of Europe had been rebuilt and had begun to boom. Congress again became involved,
calling the ostensibly superfluous MAP a "giveaway" 12 and insisted that some of the
grant aid be shifted to loans; further, a new division was set up in the Pentagon to ensure
that free arms went only to nations which could not afford to pay for them. 13 The
Europeans, many of them newly wealthy but still short of cash, insisted upon and
received co-production agreements under which U.S. arms were manufactured under
license in Europe.
B. MCNAMARA AND THE GENESIS OF FOREIGN MILITARY SALES
The election of President Kennedy and the elevation of Robert McNamara to
Secretary of Defense brought about a distinct change in U.S. security assistance, and
created the conditions which the Nixon Doctrine merely perpetuated.
Both Kennedy and McNamara had legitimate concerns over U.S. arms transfer
12 Paul L. Ferrari, U.S. Arms Exports (Washington, DC: Investor Responsibility
Research Center, 1987), 19.
13 Sampson, The Arms Bazaar, 115.
11
policy as they found it in 1 96 1 . For President Kennedy, an overriding interest was
economic: the MAP gave away $1.5 billion a year in weapons, while the U.S. deficit in
balance of payments stood at $3 billion. At the beginning of his administration, Kennedy
told his NATO allies that they must pay for their weapons, and he asked West Germany
to bear the entire cost of aid to Turkey, which was $150 million a year. 14
McNamara (in keeping with his background) was concerned not only with the
economics of the issue but also the lack of standardization in NATO: for example, in
1 96 1 NATO armies used fourteen types of small-arms ammunition, while the Warsaw
Pact used only one. 15 In response, McNamara approved the foundation of the
International Logistics Network (ILN), which was "unashamedly an organization for
selling arms." 16 By 1962, the ILN's chief, Henry Kuss, could boast that the United States
was selling twice the amount of arms (about $2 billion) per year as it was giving away in
grant aid. 17
Thus, on a historical continuum, it can be seen that the Nixon Doctrine was not
formulated merely as an excuse to sell arms, nor as a response to the sudden influx of
revenue in oil states such as Iran or Saudi Arabia. Rather, in keeping with Nixon's desire
14 Ferrari, U.S. Arms Exports, 19.
15 Sampson, The Arms Bazaar, 115.
16 Sampson, The Arms Bazaar, 116.
17 Sampson, The Arms Bazaar, 117.
12
to honor earlier commitments, it was a continuation of policy regarding the sale of arms
to nations who could afford to pay. 18
Figure 2 shows that by 1968, Foreign Military Sales began to outnumber MAP
grants in dollar value, and by 1974 Foreign Military Sales were of greater value than the
Military Assistance Service Fund, which was the program in place to assist South
Vietnam, Laos and Thailand.
FIGURE 2 19




These renewed foreign military sales began to go largely to the free world
18 A discussion of other scholars' opinions regarding Nixon's motivations appears
later in the text.
19 Krause, Arms and the State, 100.
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orientation areas in response to parallel Soviet attempts to use arms transfers as a policy
tool; in essence, arms sales became a well-known competition between the United States
and the Soviet Union, and, in fact, shrewd governments used this to force concessions
from one government merely by threatening to buy arms from the other. The Shah of
Iran played this card as well as any, shocking the United States with his large purchases
of Soviet gear in 1966, which resulted in greater U.S. assistance thereafter. As for Latin
America, another Kennedy initiative ushered in the counterinsurgency era, and "... the
basis for military aid to Latin America abruptly shifted from hemispheric defense to
internal security . . . against Castro-communist guerrilla warfare." 20 Beginning in 1963,
the MAP provided not only surplus World War II or Korean War arms, but grants or
credits for counterinsurgency hardware and training, for both military and paramilitary
forces. 21
McNamara's dictum that "security is development" consciously steered U.S.
security assistance in Latin America away from costly, high-tech weapons, which were
perceived as wasteful and unnecessary for a developing country. Official doctrine held
that "... the need for expensive arms by Latin American countries does not appear great.
They are protected against conventional military threats by the effective inter-American
peace-keeping machinery, by the Rio Treaty guarantees, and by wide oceans." 22
20 Krause, Arms and the State, 100.
21 Quoted Krause, Arms and the State, 87-88.
22 Krause, Arms and the State, 88.
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The U.S. unwillingness to sell sophisticated weaponry, as well as a certain
arrogance in dictating the uses to which sovereign states would put their armies, had a
far-reaching effect.
C. THE GRAVY TRAIN ENDS: THE EVOLUTION OF THE FOREIGN
MILITARY SALES ACT
The Foreign Military Sales program was wildly successful during the 1 960s (see
Table 1); sales rose from $1.0 billion in FY 1962 to nearly $2 billion (in constant U.S.
dollars) in FY 1966. The precipitous drop in FY 1967 was due to a 50 percent fall in
sales to industrial countries,23 several of which had begun domestic weapons programs.
This coincided with a rise in sales to third world nations, which rose from $4.6 million in
FY 1964 to $444.5 million in FY 1966.
TABLE l 24
U.S. Military Export Sales, By Type of Order (U.S. $ million)
FY 1965 FY 1966 FY 1967 FY 1968 FY 1969
Foreign Military
Sales, cash
1137.6 1457.4 861.7 829.8 1450.6
Foreign Military
Sales, credit
110.6 320.0 320.8 263.8 281.2
Total 1248.2 1777.4 1182.5 1093.6 1731.8
23 Arms Trade, 1 70.
24 Arms Trade, 171.
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This precipitous rise is often tied to a U.S. desire to effect balance-of-payment
deficits; McNamara explicitly made this case in early 1967. The evidence suggests
otherwise, however. The 1964 Foreign Assistance Act (Sections 503 and 504) allowed
the Department of Defense to guarantee the financing of foreign military sales, while only
obligating 25 percent of the loan to back up a 100 percent guarantee; this reserve came
from the Military Assistance Credit Fund, commonly known as the "revolving fund."25
In 1965, legislation was passed which allowed this service to be provided without the
recipient paying a service charge; and that same year, the Department of Defense and the
Export-Import Bank worked out a deal.
The result was the "country-X loan," a shadow scheme whereby the Export-
Import Bank (a civilian development organization) loaned money to the Department of
Defense (under DOD guarantee, no less) and then the DOD used the loan to finance arms
sales. Ostensibly, the Export-Import bank did not deal with a country directly and thus
was not financing military sales. The country-X loans thus enabled DOD to finance arms
sales worth up to four times the actual amount of the revolving fund, without
congressional authorization .
The program was popular in the DOD, and even more so abroad because with the
exception of Chile and Argentina, the DOD subsidized the interest on accounts (see Table
2); the recipient nations paid less in interest to DOD than DOD did to the Export-Import
25 Arms Trade, 171-172.
16
Bank. Roughly 60 percent of U.S. weapons sales were made through country-X loans,
while another 20 percent were made through direct DOD loans. Further, about a third of
total Export-Import Bank loans were going to arms sales by 1967. In the third world, $4
billion a year was being spent on debt service alone, a sum equal to half of all economic
aid.26
TABLE 227
U.S. Department of Defense Loans, FY 1966-67 (U.S. $ million)












Iran 210 4-5.5 4.85-5.5 41
Saudi Arabia 143 5.1-5.5 5.5
Israel 88 3.5-5 3.5-5.5 54
India 18 3 5.5 41
Jordan 9 3 4.85 6
Morocco 4 3 4.85 3
Pakistan 3 3 5.5 3
The country-X loans, which appear to have been a conscious effort to circumvent
26 Sampson, The Arms Bazaar, 182.
27 Arms Trade, 173.
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congressional scrutiny, were not publicized;28 for example, direct loans to Australia for
military sales were listed under "miscellaneous equipment." 29
By the mid-1960s, congressional resistance to McNamara' policy was hardening
although congressional attitudes to arms transfer policy had always been ambivalent.
Since 1953, Congress had cut 15-20 percent of the defense; but by the mid-1960s,
congressional resistance palpably increased. The Indo-Pakistan War of 1965, where
Pakistanis in U.S. Patton tanks fought Indians in U.S. Sherman tanks, publicized the
issue. J.K. Galbraith, former Ambassador to India, went so far as to claim that, "The
arms we supplied under this policy caused the war."30
Sales of F-4s to Iran, A-4s to Argentina and F-5s to Morocco brought matters to a
head. Senate hearings on disarmament were held in early 1967; after a seven-week
deadlock in Congress, the following features were added to the 1967 Foreign Aid Bill:
1. A $190 million ceiling was placed on the Pentagon's
guaranteed arms sales for FY 1968.
2. After 31 December 1968, the revolving fund was to be
abolished.
3. Economic assistance to countries diverting resources to
unnecessary military expenditures would be reduced or
halted. These last amendments, known as the Conte-Long
28 Indeed, Harold Linder, the Export-Import president, stated, "I would not wish
to have it known that the bank had done specific financing for one side or the other."
Arms Trade, 172-173.
29 Arms Trade, 172.
30 Sampson, The Arms Bazaar, 181. The emphasis is Sampson's.
and Symington Amendments, were later applied to Peru in
May 1968. 31
In 1968, the Johnson administration introduced a military sales bill, codified as
the Military Sales Act of 1968. It essentially incorporated the amendments to the 1967
Foreign Assistance Bill, abolishing Export-Import loans as well as limiting DOD ability
to guarantee loans; it imposed ceilings on sales and required semi-annual reports to
Congress on sales to developing countries. Finally, it prohibited the sale of sophisticated
weaponry to all countries except Greece, Turkey, Iran, Taiwan, Korea, and Israel without
presidential approval. 32
D. COUNTERINSURGENCY AND THE LOSS OF LATIN AMERICAN
MARKETS
Considered neither a forward defense area nor a free world orientation area, Latin
America comprised a large portion of (for lack of a better term) the western hemispheric
defense system. The role of the United States as the primary weapons supplier to the
region ensured restraint in the arms trade; one study of arms transfers to the region from
1945-1965 characterized the situation as not an arms race but an "arms walk." 33
Castro's turn toward communism, fear of the revolution's spread in Latin America,
31 Arms Trade, \11
.
32 Arms Trade, 176-178.
33 Quoted in Sampson, The Arms Bazaar, 186.
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and Krushchev's famous 1961 speech calling for wars of liberation, hastened a change in
U.S. policy. As mentioned, both Kennedy and McNamara touted economic development
(McNamara felt that "revolutions arise from poverty")34 as a key to security, and they
were firm believers that internal security was more important to the region's stability than
external security.
The swiftness of the change in arms transfer patterns is noteworthy: as Figure 3
shows, internal security assistance, primarily in the form of helicopters (to replace fixed-
wing aircraft), riverine patrol boats, and counterinsurgency (COIN) teams,35 as a
percentage of total military aid in Latin America rose from 3 percent in 1960 to 28
percent in 1961, 68 percent in 1963 and over 76 percent by 1967.36
34 Arms Trade, 155.
35 Arms Trade, 708.
36 Arms Trade, 708.
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FIGURE 3
Internal Security Aid as Part of Total Military Aid to Latin America, 1960-1967
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
Year
The cogent point in this change was the conscious U.S. decision to place a
qualitative limit on arms transfers to the area; it was feared that acquisition of
sophisticated weaponry might divert resources from economic development and hence
lead to instability. Numerous efforts were made to keep Latin American nations from
buying sophisticated arms: notably in 1967, the United States requested that countries in
the region pledge themselves not to buy or manufacture supersonic aircraft, naval vessels
heavier than destroyers, missiles, or tanks over 30 tons.37
The counterinsurgency strategy began to have ramifications almost immediately.
In 1965, despite U.S. displeasure, Argentina began negotiations to purchase French
Mystere aircraft; the U.S. Air Force recommended F-5s, arguing that if the United States
supplied key weapons it could keep greater control over use and proliferation. The State
37 Arms Trade, 1\1
.
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Department disagreed, so instead the United States agreed to supply 50 A-4s (only 25 of
which were delivered due to Vietnam War demands). The cost of the A-4 was much
lower than for the F-5, and supposedly more in keeping with the administration's internal
security motif, though at the time, McNamara admitted that the A-4 had "absolutely
nothing" to do with internal security. 38
Peru, either overreacting39 or wishing to replace its aging fleet of F-86s,40 made
inquiries to the United States about supersonic fighters. An arms race was in the making,
as Peru approached both the United States about F-5s and the British about their
Lightning aircraft. The United States pressured Britain into refusing Peru's request, then
refused as well; this set off a chain of events which led directly to President Nixon's
decisions vis a vis Iran.
Rebuffed by Washington, which saw the request "... as a prime example of
wasteful military expenditures for unnecessarily sophisticated equipment,"41 Peru turned
to Paris. By August 1 967, a deal was struck for the purchase of twelve Mirage aircraft.
Two weeks after the deal was announced in October 1 967, the United States offered the
F-5 to Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Venezuela. To mollify Congress, the Defense
Department agreed to spread out delivery of the sophisticated aircraft over a protracted
38 Arms Trade, 1X1
.
39 Arms Trade, 718.
40 Klare, American Arms Supermarket, 88.
41 Klare, American Arms Supermarket, 88.
22
time period. This would ostensibly reduce the deleterious effect of large purchases on the
Latin American economies.
The United States also began to threaten use of the Symington Amendment
against these countries if they purchased aircraft other than the F-5. The response
justifiably was outrage from the region, and a turn toward both new sources of arms and a
desire to create domestic arms industries. One senior Brazilian officer stated that, "A
nation is only truly independent when it manufactures its own equipment."42 As good as
its word, Brazil soon began to build Italian jets under license.
By April 1968, Peru had purchased 12 Mirage aircraft and 78 AMX-13 tanks from
France; in May it bought six British Canberra aircraft.
Shortly after the U.S. offer in November 1967, Brazil announced that it would
buy equal numbers of F-5s and Mirages. In February of 1968, it purchased six HS-125
transport aircraft from Britain. In essence, Latin American began to willfully avoid U.S.
weaponry; in 1970, the day after a further U.S. offer of A-4s or F-5s to Brazil, Chile and
Columbia, Brazil announced that it would purchase 1 6 Mirages. This cannot be
construed as anything but a deliberate statement regarding the U.S. role in Latin
America's arms market. Later that year, Argentina purchased 1 4 Mirages, and Columbia
purchased 18, while contracting to train 43 pilots in France.43
42 Arms Trade, 720.
43 Arms Trade, 720.
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These French sales increased the resentment of American arms companies against
Washington; the companies complained of Congress' high-handed paternalistic approach.
From 1968 to 1972, European sales to Latin America totaled $1.2 billion, while U.S.
sales amounted to only $335 million;44 European sales accounted for 84 percent of total
Latin American purchases.45 Another blow to the U.S. arms manufacturers was that 60
percent of U.S. sales volume to the region went for parts and services on previously
delivered goods rather than end-items.46 By 1970, the U.S. Army general responsible for
military aid and sales programs admitted that, "The USA is losing the military equipment
market of Latin America."47 Table 3 shows the drop in revenues from U.S. arms sales to
Latin America.
44 Sampson, The Arms Bazaar, 187.
45 Andrew J. Pierre, The Global Politics ofArms Sales (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1982 ), 234.
46 Ferrari, U.S. Arms Exports, 164.
47 Quoted in Arms Trade, 721.
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Though Andrew Pierre argues that the loss of Latin American markets had a
negligible effect, the loss dealt a severe psychological blow to U.S. aerospace contractors,
perhaps a case more of frustration at loss of lucrative markets than actual desperation.
The industry had traditionally been susceptible to a boom and bust cycle, and a rather
short one at that; international crises seldom lasted long, and therefore boom times rarely
lasted more than a few years. Both 1958, prior to the Sputnik launch, and 1964, prior to
the expansion of the Vietnam War, had been bad years for the industry.
By 1968, with delivery due on orders made in 1965 and 1966, the industry had
reached its peak: the aerospace sector employed 1.5 million workers, with over 600,000
of them in California. The workers and the corporations possessed considerable political
clout: "However ruthless a Secretary of Defense [and by extension a president], he could
48 Ferrari, U.S. Arms Exports, 166.
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not afford to let whole communities crumble or production lines disappear."49 In 1968,
the aerospace industry accounted for 37 percent of all manufactures in California. 50
Beneath this humming facade lurked unease, however. The aerospace companies
had been facing a series of disasters since 1967, which merely began to snowball as the
Vietnam War effort wound down, the U.S. space program was cut back, and long-term
prospects for expansion in civilian airline travel dimmed. Both Douglas Aircraft (which
built the DC-9) and North American Aircraft (which built equipment for the Apollo space
missions) faced bankruptcy due to lack of orders or intolerable delays in production.
McDonnell of St. Louis bought Douglas for a low price, and Rockwell acquired North
American.
The crisis only worsened. Boeing, which in 1968 employed 100,000 people, lost
a contract for supersonic airliners, and was forced to cut 60,000 jobs while attempting to
diversify. The effort failed, and if not for the fortuitous appearance of the 747, Boeing
too would have folded.
The most spectacular crisis of all came with Lockheed, 51 which was the nation's
biggest arms company for most of the decade. In FY 1965, Lockheed received $1 .7
billion in orders, twice as much as its closest competitor, General Dynamics. Lockheed
built the C-130 and C-141 aircraft, troop transports which were in great demand
49 Sampson, The Arms Bazaar, 215.
50 Sampson, The Arms Bazaar, 216.
51 Sampson, The Arms Bazaar, 218.
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worldwide. Further, in 1964, Lockheed won the contract for the C-5A Galaxy, the largest
transport aircraft in the world. Plans were made to convert the C-5A from military to
civilian use; this would allow Lockheed to put a lock on airline manufactures as well.
The world seemed to be Lockheed's oyster.
Unfortunately, the Pentagon had been forced to adopt Robert McNamara's Total
Package Procurement Program. Prior to McNamara, companies submitted separate bids
for each successive phase of a program; these weapons programs could last for several
years from development to final production and entailed rather intensive technical work.
McNamara's concept demanded that contractors bid one overall price for the total
package - from design and development of a prototype, to production of the system, to
logistical support of the completed weapons system. The idea was to force contractors to
bid their absolute lowest in competition for the total package.
As one chronicle states, "The idea performed better on paper than in the defense
marketplace."52 Many companies discovered that it was impossible to realistically
estimate the costs for a complex project of several years duration (as opposed to the rather
pedestrian changes which McNamara's old employer, Ford Motor Company, made to
existing auto models from year to year), and enormous cost overruns became the norm.
The U.S. Navy experienced this in several areas where shipyards bid for projects which
52 Jacob Goodwin, Brotherhood ofArms: General Dynamics and the Business of
Defending America (New York: Random House, 1985), 102.
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would take dozens of years to complete, and where inflation, supply disruptions or
material cost increases over the period could not be forecast accurately.
Lockheed signed a Total Package Procurement contract for the C-5, under which
the prototype was supposed to meet specific weight, takeoff and performance
characteristics; these numbers were, according to Deputy Secretary of Defense (and
former chairman of Hewlett-Packard) David Packard, "... arbitrary to begin with . . . But
those goddamned specifications were written into the contract, and there wasn't any give
in them." 53 Not surprisingly, one of Packard's first acts in the DOD was to do away with
Total Package Procurement.
Based upon the contract's specifications, Lockheed's prototype was too heavy, so
weight had to be shaved from the aircraft's wings. Consequently, the wings were too
weak to last the required 30,000 flight hours, and had to be rebuilt.54
By 1969, Lockheed's cost overrun was in excess of $1 billion. The aircraft were
also late in delivery; the Pentagon demanded $16,000 from Lockheed for each day the
planes were late. 55 In March, Lockheed's president was asking for $640 million in
advance payments from the Pentagon (without which he said Lockheed would
discontinue its defense programs); by 1970, Lockheed was "in serious difficulties."56
53 Goodwin, Brotherhood ofArms, 211.
54 Goodwin, Brotherhood ofArms, 211.
55 Sampson, The Arms Bazaar, 219.
56 Sampson, The Arms Bazaar, 219.
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Desperate to escape its dependence on the Pentagon, that same year Lockheed was
attempting to diversify and developed the Tri Star, a wide-bodied civilian airliner
powered by Rolls-Royce engines. The British Rolls-Royce company was also in trouble,
however: writer Anthony Sampson calls the collaboration "the lame leading the lame." 57
In January 1971, Rolls-Royce declared bankruptcy; the British government nationalized
Rolls-Royce's defense sector, but elected to let the civilian unit die. This meant, in
essence, the demise of Lockheed as well. Lockheed's president traveled frantically from
Washington to London, lobbying both governments. The British government, after bitter
disputes, agreed to continue to finance the Tri Star's development on one condition: that
Washington guarantee the future of Lockheed. 58
Secretary of the Treasury John Connolly requested a $250 million loan guarantee
from Congress; and after tireless lobbying from Lockheed and President Nixon, the
Senate approved the loan by only one vote.59
57 Sampson, The Arms Bazaar, 220.
58 Sampson, The Arms Bazaar, 220.
59 Sampson, The Arms Bazaar, 221.
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III. THE NIXON DOCTRINE
One sees several trends in arms transfers which the Nixon Administration
inherited from its predecessors, and which required immediate attention. The promised
draw-down of U.S. troops in Asia was predetermined by the national mood and political
necessity: but the loss of Latin American arms markets as well as the catastrophic events
befalling U.S. arms manufacturers also demanded a quick fix.
The prior policy of circumventing congressional oversight in arms sales had been
eviscerated by the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968; thus, if arms sales were to take
place, they must be to: 1) developed countries,60 who 2) needed weapons but had no
infrastructure to build their own, and 3) could pay cash. The Nixon Doctrine was
formulated at least in part with these criteria in mind.
I shall argue that Iran met the first two conditions; and that the U.S. government
supported an oil policy which made the third possible by allowing Iran to increase its oil
revenues under U.S. protection.
During a tour of Asia in July 1969, President Nixon delivered his famous "Guam
Speech." In the speech he made an explicit break with previous policy, and with
Congressional strictures:
I believe that the time has come when the United States, in
our relations . . . should be quite emphatic on two points:
60 In November 1967, Iran was declared a "developed" country and the U.S. aid
mission was removed; this gave Iran the right to buy U.S. arms unimpeded by U.S. law,
since the Nixon Doctrine was an explicit promise to honor old obligations.
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One, that we will keep our treaty commitments . . . but two,
that as far as the problems of internal security are
concerned, as far as the problem of military defense, except
for the threat of a major power involving nuclear weapons,
that the United States is going to encourage and has the
right to expect that this problem will be increasingly
handled by, and the responsibility for it taken by, the . , .
nations themselves.61
Nixon did not see this policy, later called the Nixon Doctrine, as a U.S. withdrawal from
world affairs, but rather as a viable method for the United States to remain engaged at
lower cost in blood and treasure.62 He reiterated and expanded upon the Guam speech in
his foreign policy report to the Congress on 18 February 1970:
First, the United States will keep all of its treaty
commitments.
Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power
threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a
nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.
Third, in cases involving other types of aggression, we
shall furnish military and economic assistance when
requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But
we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the
primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its
defense. 63
This, in essence, opened the floodgates to virtually unlimited foreign military sales, as
61 Quoted in George Lenczowski, American Presidents and the Middle East
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1990), 116-117.
62 Richard M. Nixon, The Memoirs ofRichard Nixon (New York: Grosset &
Dunlap, 1978), 395.
63 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies ofContainment (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1982), 298.
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weapons replaced a U.S. presence in some regions (with Europe the exception). The





U.S. Arms Transfers Worldwide, 1971-1985
As can be seen from the figure, Nixon's pronouncement had long-reaching effects.
In 1971, U.S. military grants were $2.2 billion; by 1976 they totaled only $265,000.
There are two noteworthy trends; the 1972 increase in MAP, which reflects the U.S. troop
withdrawal from Southeast Asia (and the ultimately unsuccessful attempt to replace U.S.
troops with U.S. equipment); and the 1973-1974 and 1979-1982 increases in Foreign
Military Sales, reflecting increased oil revenue in the Gulf states, and the shift in focus
64 Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson, Arms Transfers to the Third World
1971-85 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 49.
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from Iran to Saudi Arabia respectively. Total deliveries of U.S. arms rose 150 percent
from 1968-1977, with the majority of these to "developing countries"; the 1979-1980
decline highlights the loss of the Iranian market.
Although most sources65 trace the Nixon Doctrine solely to the U.S. presence in
Vietnam, an examination of the timeline shows a fascinating intersection of related
occurrences, which pointed to a different conclusion. Following British Prime Minister
Harold Wilson's announcement that the United Kingdom would withdraw from the
Persian Gulf in 1971, President Nixon ordered his National Security Advisor, Henry
Kissinger, to formulate a basic policy framework for the region. The resulting document,
National Security Council Study Memorandum 66 (NSSM-66) was submitted to the
White House on July 12, 1969,66 more than a week before Nixon left on his trip to the
Pacific.
A major conclusion of that study . . . was that the United
States would not assume the former British role of protector
in the Gulf area, but that primary responsibility should
henceforth fall on the states of the region ... we are willing
to assist the Gulf states but we look to them to bear the
main responsibility for their own defense and to cooperate
among themselves to insure regional peace and stability.
We especially look to the leading states of the area, Iran
and Saudi Arabia, to cooperate for this purpose.67
This was codified in National Security Decision Memorandum 92 (NSDM-92), which
65 With Hartung the exception.
66 Klare, American Arms Supermarket, 112.
67 Klare, American Arms Supermarket, 1 14-115.
34
directed that Iran be encouraged to assume "... primary responsibility for peace and
stability in the Gulf."68 The documents remain classified; in fact the Index of National
Security Documents does not even list the two documents.
The evidence strongly suggests that the Nixon Doctrine was "premeditated,"69 and
the Guam speech based as much on making possible Nixon's "twin pillars" policy in the
Gulf as disentangling U.S. forces from Vietnam. At the same time, as discussed above,
Nixon was aware that cutbacks in Vietnam War spending would harm defense
contractors; the prospect of unimpeded access to new foreign markets under the Nixon
Doctrine offered a much needed financial shot in the arm to these companies. 70 As for
fundamental motivation, Kissinger and Nixon shared a certain amount of bitterness over
the "cumulative constraints" 71 (Kissinger's words) placed upon U.S. military aid to
Southeast Asia. The use of foreign military sales, which were not subject to
Congressional oversight or approval, gave the President a formidable policy tool which
the legislative branch could not legislate.72
An astute political solution, the Nixon Doctrine could be touted as all things to all
68 Klare, American Arms Supermarket, 117.
69 William D. Hartung, And Weaponsfor All (New York: Harper-Collins, 1994),
ch. 2. Hartung disagrees, but seems to presuppose that Nixon was a bungler. I would
argue that Nixon was shrewder than to change policy that drastically "off the cuff."
70 Hartung, And Weaponsfor All, 29.
71 Hartung, And Weaponsfor All, 29.
72 Hartung, And Weaponsfor All, 47.
35
people: it supported containment of the Communist threat by supporting "regional
surrogates;" whether through Asianization to contain the Chinese threat, or the twin
pillars to guard the Persian Gulf against Soviet threats. In fact, containment was the
bedrock upon which the Nixon doctrine rested: despite U.S. troop withdrawal from some
areas (325,000 from Asia alone in 1969-1971), the United States maintained its troop
strength in Europe, where the Soviet threat was strongest. Stephen Gibert's comment that
the Nixon Doctrine was a "Europe first" policy73 is probably correct: but since
Europeans did not buy many U.S. weapons, Nixon needed to turn to another source. It is
noteworthy that the aerospace industry became progressively more dependent on foreign
military exports. As Figure 5 shows, military aircraft orders from abroad rose from $840
million in 1972 to $2.5 billion by 1975.
73 Stephen Gibert, "Implications of the Nixon Doctrine for Military Aid Policy",
Orbis 16:3 (Fall 1972), 677.
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Further, the Nixon Doctrine saved American lives by keeping the boys at home
and away from regional brushfires. In essence, U.S. strategy evolved from a 2 lA Major
Regional Contingency (MRC) footing to 1 14 MRC footing; 75 and finally, it kept the
defense industries solvent by advocating unlimited arms sales to our allies. Therefore,
Vietnamization, while making political hay, was not the foundation of the Nixon
Doctrine.
Administration officials consistently argued that the
Nixon-Shah agreement was neither ill-conceived nor
hastily contrived. "Our [arms] supply policy is not the
result of a series of improvisations," Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense Noyes told the House Foreign Affairs
Committee in 1973, but followed directly from the 1969
decision (i.e., NSDM-92) to encourage Iran to assume
"primary responsibility for peace and stability" in the
Gulf.76
74 Sampson, The Arms Bazaar, 241
.
75 Gibert, "Implications . . .", 677.
76 Klare, American Arms Supermarket, 1 1 7.
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Thus was born the "twin pillar" policy of arming Saudi Arabia and Iran as U.S. surrogates
in the Persian Gulf.
38
IV. IRAN
A. U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE IN THE PERSIAN GULF
Since the 1940s, U.S. policy in the Middle East has been primarily based on three
concerns: access to oil; the survival of Israel; and containment of hostile states in the
Gulf region, first the Soviet Union, then later Iran and Iraq respectively. This policy has
remained surprisingly consistent, and U.S. initiatives in the region must first be examined
in the light of these concerns.
With access to oil the first priority for the United States, and the Gulf region the
world's largest oil reserve, U.S. policy would naturally devolve to friendly (i.e., non-
Communist) powers in the region. In 1969-1970, Iran and Saudi Arabia were the wise
choices; the 150,000-man Iranian Army as well as its sizable navy and air force made it
the major power (with or without U.S. aid) in the region:
Thus Iran could fulfill the role that the Nixon Doctrine
envisaged for regional powers. It had ample manpower (in
contrast to friendly but underpopulated Saudi Arabia), and
its royal government had virtually identical views with the
United States regarding the Soviet danger and the need to
contain it. "Iran, under the Shah," wrote Kissinger, "was
one of America's best, most important, and most loyal
friends in the world." 77
In fact, Iran met all the necessary criteria: it was anti-Soviet due to its own
misadventures with the USSR after World War II; it was friendly to Israel; and it
77 George Lenczowski, American Presidents and the Middle East, 1 1 8.
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controlled both a large oil supply and, more importantly, the Strait of Hormuz, which all
tankers had to transit in exiting the Gulf. This fit in well not only with the new Nixon
Doctrine, but also with long-standing U.S. naval theory, which placed maximum
importance upon such transit areas: in fact, naval strategists referred to the Strait of
Hormuz as "the global chokepoint." 78
U.S. dependence upon the Shah of Iran meshed perfectly with the Shah's self-
image, as well. The Shah thought of himself as a global strategist: '"Not only do we have
national and regional responsibilities,' he told Arnaud de Borchegrave ofNewsweek in
1973, 'but also a world role as guardian and protector of 60 percent of the world's oil
reserves (emphasis added).'" 79 Further, he wished to bring Iran on a par with France or
West Germany as a world power, specifically as the world's fifth superpower.80 He
considered this possible in his role as guardian of the Gulf.
It is worth noting what America hoped to gain from this particular policy, and the
tangible results of its arms transfers to Iran. First was control of the region without
deploying U.S. troops: the experience in South East Asia had created an unwillingness to
utilize U.S. troops; the costs were high both politically and economically. The basic
premise of arms sales is that they will skew the purchaser's policy in the desired direction,
78 Christopher C. Joyner, ed., The Persian Gulf War (New York: Greenwood,
1990), 237.
79 Klare, American Arms Supermarket, 115.
80 Manucher Farmanfarmaian, Blood and Oil (New York: Random House,
1997), 414-415.
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and it was hoped that Iran would put U.S. interests first in exchange for large amounts of
arms. Second was continued access to oil for the U.S., European, and Japanese markets;
and finally, Nixon desired containment of the Soviet Union.
The Shah had shown a decided ability to play off of the U.S. fear of Soviet
expansion. As early as 1966, the Shah's military purchase agreement with the Soviets
had been a method to pressure President Johnson into selling him the F-4. Further, he
threatened to ". . . sleep with the devil if U.S. arms sales continued to be tied to economic
development." 81 The U.S. also recognized that the Soviets were attempting to gain a
greater influence in the region as shown by an increase in naval presence, first in 1 969
and then again in 1972 (see Tables 4 and 5).
TABLE 482
U.S. and Soviet Ship-Days in the Indian Ocean, 1968-1973
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
U.S. 1,688 1,315 1,246 1,337 1,435 2,154
Soviet 1,760 3,668 3,579 3,804 8,007 8,543
81 James A. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion : The Tragedy ofAmerican-Iranian
Relations ( New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 171-172.
82 Michael A. Palmer, On Course to Desert Storm: The US Navy and the Persian
Gulf(Washington DC: Naval Historical Center, 1992), 76.
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In order to act as America's policeman in the Gulf, the Shah expected to acquire
military capabilities commensurate with his country's new stature.84 In 1971, he
requested to purchase F-14 and/or F-15 aircraft, technology so advanced that it had not
yet been deployed with U.S. forces. Not surprisingly, there was some resistance: "The
Defense Department was reluctant to provide technologically superior weapons that ran
the danger of falling into hostile hands, and the State Department feared that such
deliveries might become 'too provocative' for Russia."85
In May of 1972, Nixon and Kissinger met with the Shah in Tehran: they told him
explicitly that they would sell him any weapons he wanted (short of nuclear ones), and
then ordered the U.S. government bureaucracy to ensure that these sales occurred. There
seems some evidence that this may have been a quidpro quo for some assistance from
83 Palmer, On Course to Desert Storm, 77.
84 Klare, American Arms Supermarket, 116.
85 Lenczowski, American Presidents and the Middle East, 118.
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the Shah during the 1972 election; Alam's diary (p. 233) for July 1972 records a request
from Nixon whose import is such that Alam refuses to divulge it "for fear that it would
irreparably damage relations." If so, it lends credence to my belief that the Shah had the
unconditional political and economic backing of the U.S. government with regard to both
his oil machinations and weapons purchases. Interestingly, in August of that year
Northrop's president, Tom Jones, made $150,000 in illegal contributions to Nixon's
reelection campaign; Lockheed had been pressured to do so but refused.86 As Henry
Kissinger relates, Nixon ordered that in the future, Iranian requests should not be second-
guessed. 87 Gary Sick, a military staffer on the National Security Council, describes the
effect of this order in a passage which deserves to be quoted in its entirety:
There was no precedent in U.S. history for an order directly
from the president to the national security bureaucracy
instructing it to rely on the judgment of a foreign leader in
making decisions on arms transfers. It will not do to argue
seven years later that the directive had no effect. It did.
The president's order was unequivocal and comprehensive.
It afforded not the smallest loophole for those who
questioned the wisdom of a blank check to the shah. There
were indeed rear-guard actions within the bureaucracy to
attempt to moderate the effects of the decision, but they
were largely futile. The order was implemented, with a
vengeance. 88
86 Sampson, The Arms Bazaar, 271-275.
87 Andrew J. Pierre, The Global Politics ofArms Sales, 145.
88 Gary Sick, All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter With Iran (New York:
Penguin Books, 1986), 22.
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As is well-known, and chronicled in numerous sources, 89 Iranian spending on
U.S. arms skyrocketed (see Table 6). Shortly after the Tehran meeting (where President
Nixon personally told him that he could choose between the F-14 and the F-15),90 the
Shah ordered 80 F-14s at an estimated cost of $2 billion, along with dozens of other U.S.
weapons systems. Iranian spending on U.S. arms soared from $500 million in 1972 to
$2.2 billion in 1973 and a staggering $4.3 billion in 1974. 91 LT Gen Howard M. Fish,
director of the Defense Security Assistance Agency, was chief procurement officer in the
1970s, "... and in 1977 he boasted publicly that during his tenure in this position he had
handled $36 billion in arms sales. He indicated that sixty congressional bills had been
written opposing such sales, and he proudly said that not one had gotten out of
committee." 92
89 See Klare, Chapter 6; Hartung, Chapter 2; or Pierre, pp. 142-156.
90 Sampson, The Arms Bazaar, 252.
91 Klare, American Arms Supermarket, 116-117.
92 Bill, The Eagle and the Lion, 213.
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At this point, one must examine the utility of the arms sales. Did they increase
U.S. influence in the region? In the short term the answer must be yes: indeed, to many
the Shah appeared to be following the foreign policy interests of the United States rather
than those of Iran.94 In November 1971, the day before Britain was to give the United
Arab Emirates their independence, Iranian Marines used hovercraft to seize Abu Musa
and the Tunbs, a group of islands which control the shipping channel through the Strait of
Hormuz. This was done with the acquiescence of both the UK and U.S. governments, as
the diary of Iran's court minister, Asadollah Alam, shows. In May 1970, the Shah
actually threatened the British Ambassador with military conflict if the United Kingdom
93 Klare, American Arms Supermarket, 109.
94 Pierre, The Global Politics ofArms Sales, 151.
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supported the United Arab Emirates in its claim for the islands.95 These islands had been
in dispute between Iran and the Emirates since the 1 9th century. Hence, the Shah served
notice that he was the ultimate force in the region,96 able to project power beyond his
own border. Since the U.S. saw its interests coincident with Iranian interests, the Shah
was given carte blanche to indulge his security concerns.
As a stabilizing/containment force in the region, Iran was without peer: as one
expert said in the late 1 970s, "No Third World state has a record of intervention outside
its frontiers comparable with Iran's."97 From 1971 to 1976, Iran sent a naval task force,
thousands of ground troops, and helicopter gunships to help put down the Dhofar
rebellion in Oman. Notably, Great Britain was heavily involved as well, seconding
officers to the Omani Army to lead troops against the Dhofari tribesmen. In 1973, a
squadron of thirty Iranian Chinook helicopters helped put down a "Communist" rebellion
in the Pakistani province of Baluchistan.98 In addition, the Shah sent aircraft to South
Vietnam and Morocco (although he publicly refused to endorse the U.S. position in
95 Asadollah Alam, The Shah and I, (London: I. B. Tauris, 1991) pp. 30, 34, 153.
The Iranian policy-makers whom I interviewed all vouched for the accuracy of Alam's
memoirs, though Parvoz Mina expressed reservations about disclosure of the Shah's
sexual peccadilloes.
96 Alam, The Shah and I, 37; see also Guardian ofthe Gulf, Chapter 9 for a
general overview.
97 Hartung, And Weaponsfor All, 33.
98 Jonathan Kwitny, Endless Enemies (New York: Penguin Books, 1984), 199-
204.
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Vietnam),99 as well as troops to Zaire to help President Mobutu suppress rebellion in the
Shaba province. 100 These all served U.S. interests as well as Iran's, by either supporting
U.S. proxies in other regions or by maintaining stability (i.e., Western influence) in the
Gulf. At the same time, Iranian support for Kurdish insurgents in Iraq helped destabilize
Saddam Hussein's regime, 101 another plus for the United States.
One could argue that all of Iran's interventions in the 1 970s were the result of
selfish national interests, and that U.S. arms sales did not sway the Shah's policy. In a
sense the argument is sound: for instance, the Shah's desire to put an Iranian naval flotilla
in the Indian Ocean was a direct attempt to protect Iranian oil, 1 00 percent of which was
transported by ship. With the arrival of Soviet shipping in the region, and the Shah's
explicit argument against a U.S. presence in the Gulf, he needed to be able to back up his
position. But Iranian self-interest worked in the U.S. favor; this can be seen in a
comparison of U.S. Navy steaming hours in the Indian Ocean (see Figure 6). In 1976,
with the Shah in power, only 3 percent of U.S. aircraft carriers were deployed to the
Indian Ocean; by 1980, after the invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian revolution, this
figure had increased to 50 percent. The number of carrier ship-days in the region
increased from 19 in 1976 to 836 in 1980. The cost of Iran's revolution to the U.S. Navy
in manpower, maintenance and logistics was (and remains) enormous; a rule ofthumb is
99 Alam, The Shah and I, 215.
100 Hartung, And Weaponsfor All, 33.
101 Alam, The Shah and I, 230-23 1
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that it takes four ships to support the deployment of one: essentially, the rise in ship-days
in the Indian Ocean region cost the U.S. Navy about three times that much in
maintenance, etc. It was indeed economical and bloodless to utilize Iran as proxy; in fact,
Iran in the early 1970s is probably the single best argument for the surrogate strategy.
Figure 6 102
U.S. Ship-Days: Indian Ocean Region
Carrier Ship Days
1986
B. CONSPIRACY, N'EST-CE PAS?
The second U.S. imperative, access to oil, is somewhat more problematic. Since
the Nixon Doctrine was a premeditated policy to arm the Shah of Iran, a mechanism was
necessary to implement the policy. Considering that 90 percent of Iranian government
revenues came from oil sales, the primary factor which allowed Iran to assume its role as
102 Michael A. Palmer, On Course to Desert Storm (Washington, DC: Naval
Historical Center, 1992), 97.
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U.S. surrogate in the Persian Gulf was a precipitous rise in oil revenues from 1971 to
1974.
It is necessary to examine U.S. energy policy and the changes in world oil supply
patterns which not only made oil price increases possible but practically pre-ordained;
this examination will clarify how the Nixon Administration could manipulate oil prices to
benefit OPEC (specifically Iran and Saudi Arabia) while disavowing any knowledge of or
participation in any such activity.
In 1938 (the year oil was discovered in Saudi Arabia), the United States produced
62 percent of the world's oil. 103 After the Second World War, energy consumption
patterns began to change both in regard to sources and demand.
The post-war conversion from coal to oil, especially in Europe, was hastened by a
combination of coal shortages (due to miners strikes or overly large demand, especially in
colder-than-average winters), concern about pollution resulting from coal burning, and
the increasing cost of coal vis a vis oil.
More important, of course, was the trend toward higher worldwide demand. As
Figure 7 shows, worldwide demand in 1948 was 5.8 million barrels per day (MBD) in the
United States, 970,000 barrels per day in Europe and 32,000 in Japan; by 1972, those
figures had tripled to 16.4 MBD in the United States, while demand in Europe increased
15 times over to 14.1 MBD; Japan's growth in demand was nothing less than spectacular,
103 James A. Noyes, The Clouded Lens : Persian Gulf Security and US Policy
(Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1982), 47.
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increasing 137 times over to 4.4 MBD. 104 In fact, in the early 1950's, oil provided less
energy to Japan than firewood. 105 Part of this worldwide growth in consumption can be
explained by the explosive growth of the automobile: ownership in the United States
rose from 45 million autos in 1948 to 1 19 million by 1972. The figures from outside the
United States were greater. Numbers rose from 18.9 million in 1948 to 161 million. 106
FIGURE 7 107




The change in consumption patterns was accompanied by a diversification of the
oil industry: immediately after the Second World War there were only nine oil
104 Daniel Yergin The Prize: The Epic Questfor Oil, Money & Power (New
York, NY: Simon & Schuster), 541.
105 Yergin, The Prize, 545.
106 Yergin, The Prize, 542.
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companies operating in the Middle East; by 1956, nineteen; and by 1970 there were 81.
Further, between 1953 and 1972, more than 350 other companies had either entered or
expanded operations in the foreign oil industry. 108 This expansion resulted in a decrease
in profitability, as well as a drop in prices for Middle East oil. As early as 1949,
independent oilmen in the United States were complaining about the threat of being
undercut by imported oil.
By the mid-fifties, oil from abroad had overcome the
transportation costs plus the modest import duty of 1 cents
a barrel and was underselling U.S. oil not only on the
Eastern seaboard but as far inland as western Pennsylvania.
Compared to their 1953-56 average, the rates of return for
the leading sellers in the Eastern part of the country had by
1957 begun to fall; and by 1958, they had dropped 45
percent in the case of Mobil and Shell, 43 percent for
Exxon, and 33 percent for ARCO. 109
By 1954, foreign imports equaled 15 percent of domestic production, and by
1957, 19 percent. Texas oilmen fiercely lobbied for protection from foreign oil; President
Eisenhower demurred, convinced that use of cheaper imported oil was not only good for
consumers but also important for the national security; Secretary of State Dulles
maintained that this policy ensured a healthy U.S. reserve of oil in case of emergency.
Finally, the recession of 1958, and congressional pressure from Speaker of the
108 Yergin, The Prize, 531-532.
109 Blair, The Control of Oil, 170.
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House Sam Rayburn and Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson forced Eisenhower to
impose mandatory quotas on oil imports to the United States. 1 10
Figure 8 shows the relative price of U.S. and Middle Eastern oil from 1945-1960.
As the graph shows, once exploration started in earnest, prices for Middle East crude
dropped while U.S. prices remained stagnant. In fact, the average price of U.S. oil at the
wellhead went from $2.90 a barrel in 1959 to only $2.94 a barrel in 1968; throughout the
1960s, Middle East crude was generally 60-70 percent cheaper than Texas crude. 1 '
'
FIGURE 8 112
United States and Middle East Crude Oil Prices, 1945-60
U.S. $ per Barrel
The unintended consequence of this policy was to force U.S. industries into using
expensive American oil, while Japan and Europe experienced much of their economic
110 Yergin, The Prize, 537-538.
1 1
1
Yergin, The Prize, 539.
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renaissance due to their competitive advantage in utilizing the cheaper Middle East oil.
This competitive advantage was to figure in Henry Kissinger's later calculations
regarding Middle East oil; in his view, a large price increase would inevitably favor the
United States over Western Europe and Japan. 113
The economic boom of the 1950s and 1960s (fueled by cheap and accessible oil)
gave way to a decided shift in world oil patterns by about 1970. Essentially, the United
States ran out of surplus capacity: From 1957 to 1963, U.S. surplus stood at 4 MBD, but
by 1970 it had fallen to no more than 1 MBD 1 14 and dropped about 2 percent annually,
until by 1975 it had dropped another 13 percent. 115
Further, American oil production reached its all-time peak of 1 1.3 MBD by 1970;
in March of the following year, for the first time in decades, the Texas Railroad
Commission (which controlled oil production in the state) allowed all-out production at
100 percent of capacity. The commission's chairman called the occasion, "Damned
historic, and a sad one." 1 16 This was no surprise: as early as 1968, the State Department
had warned European nations of such a contingency. 1 17
The rise in demand as well as the limitations of U.S. production brought a rise in
113 Telephone interview with Ambassador James Akins, 3 October 1997.
114 Yergin, The Prize, 567.
115 Blair, The Control of Oil, 276.
116 Yergin, The Prize, 567.
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oil imports: from 2.2 MBD (19 percent of U.S. oil consumption) in 1967, oil imports to
the United States rose to 6.6 MBD in 1973, about 36 percent of U.S. oil consumption. 1 ,8
The 1 973 oil embargo, however, created a different dynamic between the United States
and the oil states.
The embargo, which resulted in a disruption of only five percent of U.S. oil
imports, created a well-known shock to the economic system. Prices rose from $3 a
barrel to $1 1 a barrel for crude oil, and military options were actually considered to
maintain oil flows. Some argue that the embargo indicates that arms sales to Saudi
Arabia and Iran did not effect policy, and in fact merely armed those who later used oil as
a weapon against the United States. Michael Palmer, a naval historian, views the Iranian
response differently. His explanation deserves full quotation:
The absence of port facilities handicapped American naval
operations in the Indian Ocean basin, but the [1973-1974]
Arab oil embargo threatened to disrupt the operations of the
U.S. Navy in the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean, and the
Western Pacific. The navy found itself relying on Iranian
sources of supply. The shah personally directed the Iranian
National Oil Company to divert fuel to the Iranian Imperial
Navy, which, in turn, transferred the fuel to the U.S. Navy.
The shah's assistance allowed the American navy to
continue to operate in the Indian Ocean, a development that
many viewed at the time, and continue to view, as a
vindication of the Nixon administration's decision to rely
on the shah. 119
Michael Klare sees the oil embargo as a perverse win-win game in which the rise
1,8 Yergin, The Prize, 567.
1 19 Palmer, On Course to Desert Storm, 99.
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in oil prices forced the U.S. to sell arms in order to maintain a viable balance of payments
with newly-rich Iran. 120
An even more interesting theory is whispered by William Hartung but fairly
shouted by Jonathan Kwitny, a renowned investigative reporter and harsh critic of U.S.
foreign policy. His evidence shows that the embargo was merely part of a larger pattern
whose timetable coincides with Nixon's foreign policy vis a vis Iran and Saudi Arabia.
Kwitny says that a strong case can be made that the oil price rise was a product of U.S.
foreign policy: that the embargo was merely a part of ongoing U.S. strategy to allow Iran
to purchase U.S. arms, keeping both the military industrial complex in business and
acting as a speedbump to Soviet incursions toward the Gulf; and that the U.S.
government allowed oil prices to rise in order to provide Iran with the revenue to pursue
U.S. interests in the Gulf. "OPEC had been around since 1960; therefore, why had such a
long time passed before someone got it into his head to exploit their potential power?
Whose idea was it to exploit OPEC? And why did the U.S. and other consuming
countries, so determined over many decades to control Middle Eastern oil, suddenly cave
in with so little resistance?" Surely, says Klare, not because Kissinger was a softy. 121
The genesis of the oil price rise began in late 1968. The large military outlay
which the Shah insisted upon for the fiscal year 21 March 1969-21 March 1970 put great
1 20 Klare, American Arms Supermarket, 118-119.
1
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pressure on the government's budget: so much so that indirect taxes had to be increased.
Further, water prices were increased by 70 percent, while both businesses and the
universities faced financial crises. 122 It was recognized, however, that despite these
measures, the deficit could only be made good by generating higher oil revenues. 123
Consequently, the Shah met in Zurich with representatives of the Iranian Oil
Consortium (described below) and demanded a 1 percent increase in production; this
would have guaranteed Iran $1 billion in revenues. The consortium countered with a 4.5
percent increase (revenues of $900 million for the year), which the U.S. Ambassador
admitted was "simply inadequate." 124 At the same time, however, the ambassador also
made known his fears that if Iran took unilateral action in raising oil production, other
Middle Eastern countries might follow, and advised against such a move. This would be
one of the last times that U.S. policy would follow such a line.
The talks in Zurich were inconclusive (although the consortium finally agreed to
accommodate the Shah in mid- 1969); the Shah was arguing from a position of weakness:
122 Alam, The Shah and I 39.
123 Alam, The Shah and I, 35n.
124 Alam, The Shah and I, 34. The American Ambassador, a career State
Department official named Armin Meyer, was replaced by Douglas MacArthur (the
general's nephew and a Nixon appointee) in October 1969. MacArthur has been
described as "more Persian than the Persians." This sympathy would later play a
deciding role during the Irwin mission in 1971.
56
not only was the treasury empty, 125 but the consortium had a much greater interest in
maintaining or increasing production in other Gulf states.
As shown by the table, nearly all of the members of the Iranian Oil Consortium
owned a greater share in either Kuwaiti or Saudi oil than they did in Iranian oil: this was
especially true of U.S. companies; since reserves in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were larger
and production costs lower, there was no overriding motive to increase Iranian production
over other Gulf production since profits would actually be lower for Iranian oil. The
consortium's unwillingness to exploit Iranian oil had been a complaint of the Shah's for
some time previously, and would reappear in later negotiations.
TABLE 7 126
Distribution of Oil Shares in the Persian Gulf
Company Shares in Iranian Shares in Shares in




British Petroleum 40 50
Royal Dutch-Shell 14
Compagnie Francaise des Petroles 6
Standard Oil (Exxon) 7 30
Socony Mobil Oil 7 10
Standard Oil (California) 7 30
Gulf Oil 7 50
Texas Oil Company (Texaco) 7 30
Iricom 5
'An agency made up of nine separate American companies, each holding between 0.4 percent and 1.25 percent of the
Consortium's shares.
125 Alam, The Shah and I, 37.
126 Alam, The Shah and I, 30.
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This point should be borne in mind when considering the "Twin Pillars" strategy:
since Saudi production and Iranian production were linked by the "Average Program
Quantity" (a forecast governing output for the year), and American companies in Aramco
had the deciding votes in the Iranian Consortium (based on a rather complex computation
schedule), it would be known that no matter what Iranian oil did, Saudi oil would be
pegged to its production rate, and always a little higher. 127 Thus, ifprices were to rise,
rather than production, the Aramco companies wouldprofitfrom a deal with Iran, and
might actually support one.
Reflecting Iran's financial crisis, during the Shah's first meeting with President
Nixon in April 1 969, he discussed several desperate schemes with the President. First
was a project for the U.S. government to buy Iranian oil and stockpile it underground as a
strategic reserve; next, the Shah suggested that Iran barter any oil over the 12.5 percent
import quota for American goods and services. The Shah had seemingly discussed such
arrangements informally with U.S. companies, as he mentioned several by name who
could act as his partner; 128 when none of these suggestions stirred the President, the Shah
intimated that Iran would ". . . prefer to remain independent of Soviet influence," 129 but
might not be able to.
Interestingly, in that same month Armand Hammer, president of the independent
127 Blair, The Control of Oil, 105-108.
128 Alam, The Shah and I, 49-50.
129 Alam, The Shah and 1, 49-50.
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oil company Occidental Petroleum, declared in a private meeting with the Shah's court
minister that he would market at cost any quantity of oil that Iran could obtain, or operate
any portion of the agreement area that Iran might take back from the consortium due to
under-exploitation. 130 This not only gave Iran a fallback position (albeit small) but
illustrates the cutthroat competition between independent oil companies like Occidental
and the larger oil companies such as Exxon and Shell (hereafter called "the majors").
This competition would later facilitate Nixon administration policy in the Gulf.
Another scheme upon which Iran fixed its hopes to raise oil production was that
of Kurdish rebellion; it was believed that after Kurds had sabotaged pipelines around
Mosul and Kirkuk, the oil companies would criticize the substandard Iraqi security and
switch Iraqi production targets to Iran. 131 This idea, like the others, seems to have died a
quiet death, however. Further, an official from the National Iranian Oil Company
(NIOC) suggested that Iran, on its own initiative , stockpile oil on U.S. soil, and entitle the
United States to draw upon it simply by increasing Iran's production quota. The Shah's
need for increased production is evident; note that none of these plans included a request
to increase prices : at the time this idea seemed beyond the pale.
Upon the Consortium's agreement to a compromise in May of 1969, the Shah was
130 Alam, The Shah and I, 55. One of the Shah's threats was to reduce the
consortium's oil concession area and begin oil production operations in the heretofore
"fallow areas" himself.
131 Alam, The Shah and I, 39.
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able to plan an oil income of around $1.01 billion, of which about $80 million was an
advance loan on production from the consortium. 132
Therefore, a comparison can be made: already, the 1970 defense budget was $880
million, on oil revenues of only $1.01 billion. Obviously, this rate of spending would be
unsustainable for Iran. The Shah recognized this; as early as October 1969, he floated a
plan to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee under which Iran would allocate a $100
million oil quota for the U.S. in exchange for arms. 133 The Shah argued that Iran wanted
the means to be self-sufficient; that Iran was forced to buy weapons on the open market
and wished to buy American; and ominously, that the United States already relied on
imported oil. Finally, he guaranteed that in exchange for an oil quota, every cent of the
oil income would be spent in the United States. Further, Iran informed the U.S.
Ambassador that it planned to purchase $800 million in U.S. arms, $200 million from the
UK. and $200 million from the USSR. Concerned that it would turn elsewhere for
assistance, 134 the United States needed a plan to keep Iran in the fold. Could the oil
price explosion have resulted from such a plan, conceived or agreed to by the U.S.
government, to arm the Islamic oil countries? 135
132 Alam, The Shah and I, 61.
133 Shahram Chubin and Sepehr Zabih, The Foreign Relations ofIran (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1974), 110-111.
134 Alam, The Shah and l 136.
135 Kwitny, Endless Enemies, 191. Interestingly, sources differ on the Shah's
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The impetus for this plan came in September 1969, after Muammar Qaddafi's
coup in Libya. In January 1970, after expelling the U.S. and British militaries, Qaddafi
demanded a 43-cent per barrel increase in the price of Libyan oil; he warned the twenty-
one oil companies in Libya that he would shut down production to get it. "People who
have lived without oil for 5000 years can live without it again," he threatened. 136
Libya supplied 30 percent of Europe's oil. With the Suez Canal closed (making it
cheaper to transport Libyan oil across the Mediterranean), a pipeline rupture in Saudi
Arabia that spring, and the resultant tripling of tanker rates from the Gulf, Libya
bargained from a strong position. Despite this, it was rebuffed by the majors, so turned
its attention on Armand Hammer's Occidental, ordering the company to cut production
from 800,000 barrels per day to 500,000. 137
Hammer attempted to find other companies to help him in his struggle against
Qaddafi. Because the majors had a small stake in Libya (by design - King Idris had not
trusted them), 138 the Libyan demands on Occidental served to increase prices for the
independent dealers and thereby help the majors. Occidental asked Exxon for a
guarantee: it would stand up to Qaddafi if Exxon would supply Occidental with oil at
cost until the Libyan situation was resolved. Exxon, which for several years had seen
itself underpriced in the marketplace by up to 10 percent a gallon by Occidental,
136 Yergin, The Prize, 578.
137 Yergin, The Prize, 578.
138 Kwitny, Endless Enemies, 192.
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refused. 139 A month later, in August, Occidental's output was reduced to 440,000 barrels
per day. At this point, desperate for oil, Hammer traversed the globe looking for
suppliers; one of his more imaginative ideas was his attempt to put together a barter deal
whereby he would be the middleman in trading McDonnell Douglas warplanes for
Iranian oil. 140 In September 1970, Occidental capitulated, agreeing to an immediate price
increase of thirty cents a barrel, rising in five years to forty cents. Within months the
other companies in Libya capitulated as well. 141
Electrified by the Libyan success, the Shah demanded (and received) concessions
from the Iranian Consortium; in November 1970, the old profit-sharing formula (50
percent for the consortium, 50 percent for Iran) was changed to one giving Iran 55
percent of profits. 142 Less than two weeks later, the Shah was making plans to buy
"many more aircraft" and three destroyers, as well as taking control of an unnamed
airbase on U.S. soil (all at Iranian expense) as a training school for Iranian pilots. 143 He
was also making plans to demand new concessions at OPEC's Tehran meeting scheduled
for early 1971.
139 Kwitny, Endless Enemies, 193.
140 Yergin, The Prize, 579.
141 Blair, Control of Oil, 222-223.
142 Alam, The Shah and I, 173.
143 Alam, The Shah and I, 175.
62
C. THE UNITED STATES OPENS THE DOOR: THE IRWIN MISSION
The oil companies, led by Shell Oil, decided that the only way to confront OPEC
was with a united front; they feared that individual negotiations would merely allow
OPEC to defeat the oil companies piecemeal. The first order of business was to get State
Department and Justice Department approval for this action. This was not a new idea.
The issue of anti-trust actions had shadowed the multinational companies' relations with
the U.S. government since 1953, based primarily on the oil companies' desire to negotiate
en bloc. Interestingly, throughout this time John J. McCloy, legal counsel for the seven
majors, had held informal discussions with every Attorney General since Robert Kennedy
preparing for the contingency of oil producing states escalating their demands on the
companies. 144 In early January, the group of 23 oil companies was granted a "Business
Review" letter signed by an Assistant Attorney General, which granted them defacto
anti-trust exemptions, though only Congress could grant dejure exemptions. This was
the first sign of an attempt by the executive branch to keep Congress in the dark regarding
its surrogate policy in the Persian Gulf.
Afterward, again with U.S. government blessing, the bloc released its Libyan
Producers Agreement, which stated that the oil companies had:
. . . concluded that we cannot further negotiate development
of claims by member countries of OPEC on any other basis
than one which reaches a settlement simultaneously with all
producing governments concerned. It is, therefore, our
144 Mira Wilkins, "The Oil Companies in Perspective", Daedalus 104:4 (Fall
1975), 166.
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proposal that an all-embracing negotiation should be
commenced between representatives of ourselves, together
with such other oil companies as wish to be associated with
this proposal on the one hand, and OPEC, as representing
all its member countries on the other hand, under which an
overall and durable settlement could be achieved. 145
Further, the independents insisted upon, and received, the same deal from the
majors which Exxon had refused Occidental only months before. Called the "Safety Net
Agreement," it stated that:
If a company were cut back or nationalized in Libya and its
oil exports seized, the other Libyan companies would bear
a percentage of that prorated according to their production.
To share this burden equitably with the Persian Gulf
producers, the Libyan group could in turn get oil to meet
what they have given to the person who was shut back in
Libya; they could get fall-back oil, if you will, from the
gulf producing states where there was excess of capacity at
that point in time. 146
Had the industry backed Occidental this way earlier, things may have turned out
differently.
OPEC was scheduled to meet in Tehran in late January 1971, to discuss further
price increases, and the oil industry wished to preempt this. Therefore, the oil industry
suggested that an emissary from the President of the United States, someone "with
145 Blair, Control of Oil, 224.
146
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dignity, with clout" travel to Tehran and explain that the oil companies had the
President's support for their stance. 147
On 16 January 1971, the oil companies' message was delivered to both OPEC
headquarters in Vienna and to the Shah; that same day, U.S. Undersecretary of State John
Irwin began his Middle Eastern trip, the purpose of which was to express high level
official support for the message from the U.S. oil bloc to OPEC and the joint negotiation
strategy behind it. 148
James Akins, a senior energy expert in the State Department (and subsequently
Ambassador to Saudi Arabia) later claimed that the OPEC demands, "while alarming"
were "an economic matter which would not traditionally have engaged the American
government." Libya's threats to cut off oil "... brought the Department of State
inevitably into an active and public role." 149 This seems specious given that Qaddafi had
made these same threats a year earlier, with a deafening silence from the State
Department. Could this sudden interest have killed two birds with one stone, 150 allowing
the United States to appear that it was holding the line on oil prices while sending an
emissary to secretly tell Iran just the opposite?
147 Forbes, 172.
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The evidence suggests as much. On 1 3 January, the Iran Consortium's
representatives arrived to discuss oil pricing with the Gulf-only members ofOPEC but
suddenly cut discussions off, "clearly worrying" 151 the Shah. This suggests that the oil
companies knew that they had U.S. government support and were merely waiting for the
formal anti-trust approval. On 16 January, the Shah received the oil companies' proposals
(generally a five-year agreement on prices) which the nervous Shah (in consultation with
his finance minister, Jamshid Amouzegar) was prepared to accept.
'
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After this, the Shah learned of John Irwin's imminent arrival in Tehran, 153 so it
appears that prior to Irwin's arrival, Iran was willing to negotiate a "separate peace" on
the oil bloc's terms. Further, the Shah invited the UK. Ambassador to send the British oil
delegates early to discuss a Gulf agreement prior to the all-OPEC meeting in Tehran on
23 January. An interview with Manucher Farmanfarmaian, a director of the National
Iranian Oil Company for fifteen years (and later Iran's Ambassador to Peru and
Venezuela), seems to confirm the import of Irwin's visit. "Prior to 1971, we thought that
if Iran needed more money, we would insist on a rise in production. It was the U.S.
party's [Irwin] idea to increase oil prices. In a conversation with Amouzegar at his home
in 1972, 1 asked him what made the OPEC victory possible. He told me that once they
151 Alam, The Shah and I, 192.
152 Alam, The Shah and I, 192. This contradicts the Forbes article p. 72, which
claims that Amouzegar "promptly rejected" the oil companies' offer.
153 Alam, The Shah and I, 192.
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[Amouzegar and the Shah] discovered that the companies could not bargain as a bloc, it
was easy to raise prices."
Furthermore, Farmanfarmaian added, "with cheap oil, Japan and Europe had
given harsh competition to the United States. There was a rumor that the United States
wanted to subdue Japan and Europe on that ground [i.e., by raising the price they paid for
Middle East crude]." 154
Iran's strategy was simple: negotiate on Iran's behalf, get a deal favorable to Iran,
then disavow the demands of such radical states as Algeria and Libya.
The oil companies scheduled a meeting of their representatives, Exxon Senior
Vice President George T. Piercy and British Petroleum Director Lord Strathalmond, with
the Shah on 1 9 January. They had good reason to believe that Irwin, who was scheduled
to meet the Shah on 18 January "... was going to assert - in however covert a form - the
support of the President of the [United States] for [a united front]." 155
The 1 8 January meeting between Irwin and the Shah went differently than
anticipated. Accompanied by MacArthur, the U.S. Ambassador, and Amouzegar, the
finance minister, the Shah and Irwin discussed the oil situation for two hours.
In the meeting, Irwin was seemingly "overwhelmed" 156 by the Shah. Sent "...
1 54 Telephone interview with Manucher Farmanfarmaian at his home in Caracas,




ostensibly to provide the companies with support ... he effectively undercut the oil
companies' unified front." 157 In later testimony to a Senate subcommittee, Irwin stated,
I made it clear that the U.S. Government was not in the oil
business and did not intend to become involved in the
details of the producing countries' negotiations with the oil
companies. I stressed, not the negotiations, but the
strategic and economic impact on the Free World - of
which they were a part - that a cut or halt in production
would have. The basic mission was to stress the
importance ... of not halting production or cutting
production. 158
In essence, he left the impression that the U.S. government would accept separate
negotiations, and perhaps even price increases as long as oil flows were maintained.
Interestingly, Irwin "decided" not to deliver President Nixon's personal letter to
the Shah, fearing that the contents might offend him. 159 This leads to a question: was
Irwin truly doing the President's bidding? Or had he received other instructions, perhaps
from Kissinger? As Ambassador James Akins related in a personal interview with the
author, "The Shah had a seductive personality. Kissinger was not skeptical of him; he
had been seduced. Nixon, however, was skeptical." 160 How else does one explain a
relatively junior emissary's failure to deliver a personal missive from the President of the
United States to a monarch?
157 Wilkins, "The Oil Companies . . .", 167.
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Further, Irwin did not wait to talk to the oil company representatives about his
meeting with the Shah, but immediately cabled the State Department with his
recommendations: that the companies should open discussions and conduct separate,
parallel negotiations. 161 He then left for Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, leaving MacArthur to
debrief the oil representatives.
MacArthur's debrief of the meeting to the oil representatives was rather different
from the truth; in fact an uncharitable person would say that Ambassador MacArthur lied
brazenly. First, the representatives were dismayed by the State Department's volte-face;
to explain this away, MacArthur "left the impression" that the Shah had called the united
bloc "a dirty trick" and threatened that the "... entire Gulf would be shut down and no oil
would flow. "'62
The next day (20 January 1971), MacArthur conceded "... that Amouzegar may
have said that to him in private, and that in their talks with the Shah neither the Gulf-only
approach nor the subject of a shutdown ever came up. MacArthur now claimed that the
Shah had argued that a collective approach would be a 'monumental error,' that the radical
demands were likely to be the ones that prevailed in such circumstances." 163
Even this story is open to doubt: "Irwin and Akins [and presumably MacArthur]
never even bothered to tell the negotiators that the Shah was not threatening to interrupt




supply if they insisted on joint negotiations - Piercy for one did not learn it until Forbes
brought it to his attention [in Spring 1976]. Piercy says, 'We took them very
seriously.'" 164
Faced with this last-minute reversal in strategy and without government support,
the oil companies finally agreed to conduct separate negotiations, though some saw this
as a disastrous turning point. An interview with Mr. Parvoz Mina, a member of the
National Iranian Oil Company's technical committee and party to the 1971 Tehran
negotiations, finds that he agrees. "The Irwin mission told the Shah that oil prices could
rise; that the West could tolerate some increase in prices." In fact, this changed the
Shah's strategy for increasing revenue. Prior to this, "the Shah put pressure on companies
to increase production. He thought an oil price increase was simply too difficult. [After
the meeting with Irwin], the Shah thought - 'if the United States is favorable, this is the
best occasion to do it.' This was what caused the Shah to take the leadership at the
Tehran conference." 165
Interestingly, in the earlier meetings between the Shah and the oil companies
(presumably on 1 3 January 1971, though Mina could not recall exactly), the oil
representatives had actually threatened the Shah that "if he went along with OPEC,
164 Forbes, 76.
165 Telephone interview with Parvoz Mina, 22 October 1997.
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production would fall." This indicates some confidence on the companies' part, that they
had the Shah where they wanted him.
Kwitny agrees that there is solid evidence that the State Department acted to raise
prices independently of the large oil companies.
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the State Department
was, in effect, sacrificing economics to politics. U.S.
politicians were prepared to have U.S. motorists and
businessmen - and those in the rest of the world - pay a bit
more for oil in order to help the Shah of Iran and the Saudis
[further U.S. interests]. . . . The State Department realized
full well that they could not persuade Congress to tax
Americans for that purpose. So they did it by the back
door. 166
Therefore, in order to arm Iran, oil flows were maintained, but at great cost to
both the United States and its allies. Hartung broadens this connection: "Former U.S.
ambassador to Saudi Arabia James Akins has indicated that the arms-for-oil connection
went a step further, suggesting that Henry Kissinger may have actively encouraged the
shah to press for increased oil prices as a way to fund his purchases of U.S. armaments
under the Nixon Doctrine." 167 In a personal interview, Ambassador Akins confirmed
this: "Early in the administration, Kissinger decided to use the Shah (as a surrogate).
Kissinger pushed for an oil price increase to advance the Shah's interests." 168
Afterwards, there was little to do but give in to OPEC's demands, in exchange for
166 Kwitny, Endless Enemies, 194.
167 Hartung, And Weaponsfor All, 30.
168 Telephone interview with Ambassador Akins, 3 October 1997.
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the promise of stability. The companies began by offering a $3 billion increase to the
Gulf states over five years, while the Gulf states countered with $20 billion. The final
agreement was for a $ 1 billion package over five years, roughly a twenty cents a barrel
increase. 169
It is important to realize that the oil companies profited very little from price
increases under the Tehran agreement (as opposed to the 1973-74 increases); in fact, "...
the companies bargained vigorously against increases in posted prices so long as they
were attached to a formula permanently committing them to pay large sums to the host
governments." 170 Further, this bargain for stability was fraught with peril: as Ahmed
Zaki Yamani, the Saudi Oil Minister told George Piercy, "If the oil companies thought
they were buying stability, they were deluding themselves." 171
What was the role of the U.S. government and the Nixon administration regarding
this abrupt change in U.S. energy policy? The Senate Foreign Relations Committee
asked much the same question in its hearings on multinational oil corporations. In
Senator Church's words:
Well, now, we have a picture then of our Government
first having through waiver of the Antitrust Act permitted
the companies to join together for a common negotiation.
Then a subsequent reversal, apparently, which led to the
dissolution of that effort to maintain a united front.
What accounts ... for this reversal that took place? I




mean after all, the waiver had been granted to let them all
join together in one common negotiation and then
subsequently the American Ambassador in Iran indicates
that the American government would support breaking up
the negotiations. Why? Why did the position of the
American government change? 172
Senator Church later answered his own question, positing that, "There must have been . .
some consideration for the bilateral relations between the United States and Iran." 173
The effect was nearly immediate. From a nation which had begun running
substantial balance of payments deficits by 1 969 and by 1 970 had had to borrow money
overseas merely to finance its budget, 174 Iran got an immediate 30 percent revenue
increase, as well as a promise of future price increases and an inflation-indexed price
scale. Table 8 show the change in oil revenues for Kuwait, Iran and Saudi Arabia from
1960-1974. Table 8-1 shows oil exports in comparison.
TABLE 8 175
Government Oil Revenues (U.S. $ million)
1970 1971 1972
Saudi Arabia 1,200 2,149 3,107
Kuwait 895 1,400 1,657
Iran 1,136 1,944 2,380
172 Blair, The Control ofOil 226-227.
173 Forbes, 82.
174 Forbes, 83.




Oil Exports (millions of barrels)
1970 1971 1972
Saudi Arabia 1,359 1,707 2,163
Kuwait 1,082 1,169 1,176
Iran 1,318 1,562 1,752
In view of the available evidence, the contention that arms transfers to the Shah
drove oil prices would make sense. The Shah began to order mass quantities of weapons
in 1969 (with Nixon's and Kissinger's blessings), in fact so many that he had to impose a
special tax, 176 prior to any great rise in Iranian oil revenues. The Iranian military budget
rose from $880 million in 1970 to around $2.2 billion in 1973 and $4.3 billion in 1974.
The vast majority of orders for delivery in 1973/1974 were made in 1971 and 1972.
Iran's total oil revenues even in 1973 were only $6.3 billion. 177 Would anyone in good
conscience allow weapons sales to Iran which would total 35-65 percent of the nation's
revenues? This does not seem like good politics or good business. The truth seems
rather simple: the United States knew, encouraged, and, in my view, instigated Iran's
plan to increase oil prices. Only a casus belli was needed, and the 1 97 1 Tehran
Conference followed closely by the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, provided it. Thereafter, the
176 Alam, The Shah and I; 1969 diary entries constantly discuss budget woes, see
especially p. 39.
177 Klare, American Arms Supermarket, 119.
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United States could take orders and begin production on new weapons systems, confident
that Iran could afford them, and in turn help drive the U.S. unit price down.
Ambassador Akins expands upon this theme, discussing explicit U.S. government
involvement with oil price increases. In 1974, Akins was Ambassador to Saudi Arabia.
"Official energy policy was to restrain price increases. Faisal (King Faisal of Saudi
Arabia) agreed that prices were going up too far too fast." 178 Alam's diary independently
confirms the Saudi view, opposing further price increases. The Shah refused to consider
the Saudi position. 179
The king told Akins that, "Saudi Arabia needed Iran and one other OPEC country
[probably Kuwait] to get all ofOPEC to agree [to price freezes]." Akins reported this to
Henry Kissinger, then Secretary of State, but was warned that Kissinger was "annoyed"
by Akins' reporting. A State Department official warned Akins "... for your own good,
Kissinger doesn't like to get these reports." Akins asked for written instructions, i.e., that
official energy policy had changed, but never received such confirmation.
King Faisal himself raised the issue with Kissinger, who promised to convey
Faisal's concerns to the Shah. The Shah later told Faisal that Kissinger had never
mentioned oil prices; "When the Shah continued to raise prices," Akins says, "Faisal
178 Telephone interview with Ambassador Akins, 3 October 1997: unless
otherwise footnoted, this section is based upon Akins' testimony. I have placed his
words in quotation marks.
179 Alam, The Shah and I, 392-393.
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assumed that the United States wanted oil prices to rise, and was not serious about
keeping prices down." Further, both Akins and former Secretary of the Treasury William
Simon suggested that if the United States was serious about keeping oil prices down, "...
they could have just quit selling arms to Iran." 180
This illustrates high-level government cooperation between the United States and
Iran to raise oil prices, despite U.S. policy to the contrary.
An interesting complement to this theory is the complaint that the arms-sales tail
began to wag the arms-production dog; that, in essence, production runs would only
begin based on Iranian orders of new technologies.
In 1 966, the Shah was allowed to purchase the F-4D Phantom, establishing his
priority among foreign customers; at this time the Shah's purchase was still
approximately four years behind the United States in terms of technology. 1 81 By 1968,
Northrop's "ambassador to Iran," Kim Roosevelt, was using the Shah as a quasi-sales
agent to dissuade a European consortium from building aircraft in competition with
Northrop's planned export fighter. 182 None of this was unusual: most aerospace
180 Telephone interview with William Simon, 4 November 1997. The
abbreviated conversation was supposed to be a precursor to a longer in depth interview.
To date, Mr. Simon has not granted the protracted interview.
181 Sampson, The Arms Bazaar, 247.
182 Sampson, The Arms Bazaar, 248.
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companies had agents in Iran, and Boeing had gone so far as to appoint the Empress
Farah's uncle as their agent. 183
Perhaps the aerospace industry's single greatest beneficiary from the Nixon
Doctrine was Grumman; after a succession of relatively unsuccessful forays into the civil
sector, by the late- 1960s Grumman was hugely dependent on the Pentagon. In 1969, it
won the contract for the F-14, the first entirely American fighter built in a decade. 184
One of the last contracts awarded under Total Package Procurement, it nearly bankrupted
the company; by 1971, seven F-14s were flying, but cost overruns were $18 million in
1971, and $70 million in 1972, all at Grumman's expense. The unit price for the F-14
went up from $7.3 million to $1 1 million; Grumman needed foreign sales merely to stay
afloat. 185
By spring 1972, Grumman salesmen were pressuring the White House to allow
the Shah classified briefs on the F-14. The well-known Tehran meeting in May 1972
gave Grumman the green light to begin its salesmanship.
Grumman's rival for the lucrative Iran contract was McDonnell-Douglas, which
built the US Air Force's new F-15 fighter. Grumman won the contract through a series of
ingenious and perhaps underhanded machinations. First, they convinced the Pentagon to
support F-14 sales to Iran on the grounds that this would reduce the unit cost to the U.S.
183 Sampson, The Arms Bazaar, 249.
184 Sampson, The Arms Bazaar, 249.
185 Sampson, The Arms Bazaar, 253.
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Navy; 186 next, in a side by side comparison of the F-14 and F-15, Grumman wheeled out
a flight-ready prototype and gave an aerobatic demonstration, while the F-15 prototype
was merely a static display. Finally, Grumman hired an Iranian lobbyist ( who was a
great friend of the Iranian Air Force Chief of Staff); the agreed-upon salary for a
successful sale was $89 million. 187 Oddly, this commission was passed on by the U.S.
government to Iran as part of the cost of the aircraft.
By August 1973, the Shah had decided to buy the F-14, but the intervening events
of the Arab-Israeli War and subsequent oil crisis pushed this issue temporarily out of
sight. But in the summer of 1 974, with his increased oil revenues, the Shah ordered 80 F-
14s, at a cost of $1.9 billion. 188 The number of aircraft ordered is noteworthy in light of
the fact that the United States was projected to have a fleet of only 300.
Unfortunately, Grumman was still in dire financial straits, and could not get the
credit to begin work on the Shah's order; further, Congress voted to cut off the $200
million U.S. Navy loan which had heretofore kept Grumman afloat. 189 Grumman's
president was forced to go to the Shah and request help from the state-owned Bank Melli
Iran, which put up $75 million and formed a consortium of nine U.S. banks to give
186 Sampson, The Arms Bazaar, 253.
187 Sampson, The Arms Bazaar, 253.
188 Steven Lydenberg, Weaponsfor the World: The U.S. Corporate Role in
International Arms Transfers (New York, NY: Council on Economic Priorities, 1977),
29.
189 Sampson, The Arms Bazaar, 254.
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Grumman a $200 million loan. 190 In essence, the Shah had become not only Grumman's
customer but its banker. This was the Nixon doctrine with a vengeance.
In fact, Grumman's 1976 tax return specifically mentioned deliveries of the F-14
to Iran as the key to its financial success; Foreign Military Sales as a percentage of its
Pentagon contracts rose form 6.2 percent in 1974 to over 30 percent in 1976. 191
Iran also acted as a weapons clearing house for the United States, especially with
regard to aircraft. Northrop, who by 1976 received nearly 27 percent of Foreign Military
Sales contracts, built several aircraft specifically for export, notably the F-5A and its
successor, the F-5E. In an interesting deal worked out between governments, Iran
purchased the new F-5E in exchange for being allowed to re-transfer its F-5As to nations
of its choice: thus Ethiopia, Greece, Turkey, Jordan, and Pakistan received up to 50 F-
5As apiece from Iran.
Northrop's contract for the F-18 faced similar problems to that of the F-14. The
F-18 was a prototype developed in a competition to come up with a light fighter aircraft
in conjunction with NATO, which entailed a series of offset packages and co-production
agreements. Just before the consortium reached an agreement, the U.S. Navy shocked
everyone by announcing its decision to purchase the F-18 unilaterally and in the face of
congressional opposition to dual fighter programs. 192
190 Lydenberg, Weaponsfor the World, 28.
191 Lydenberg, Weaponsfor the World, 28.
192 Goodwin, Brotherhood ofArms, 227.
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That same month, coincidentally, the U.S. Ambassador to Iran submitted this
memorandum to the Shah, which leads me to believe that Northrop discussed the sale of
its newest U.S. fighter with Iran concurrently with the U.S. Navy; and that Northrop had
attempted to create an artificial "need" for a land-based F-l 8 whose future was far from
certain:
We are aware that Iran has recently discussed with
Northrop and associated US firms a possible barter of oil
for the land-based F-18L aircraft. According to information
from the Department of Defense, there are several factors
which Iran should be aware of as it considers the Northrop
proposal. First, the current estimate is that development of
the F-18L will cost 250-300 million dollars ... and the
development cost will be the responsibility of non-US
buyers. To our knowledge, Iran is the only buyer . . .
Secondly, if an F-18L aircraft is developed, the US Navy is
not in a position to support the aircraft. Both of these




The Shah, understandably wary, informed Northrop that he would place an order for F-
1 8s only after the US government placed its own order first. Further, the memo seems to
point out the Pentagon's misgivings about F-l 8 sales to Iran, and Iran's seeming
willingness to purchase any hardware offered.
In September, perhaps in response to the Shah's concerns, the president of
Northrop flew to Tehran for a personal audience with the Shah. Already that month the
Shah had become concerned over what appears to have been price gouging on the part of
193 Alam, The Shah and I, 486-487.
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the U.S. government (a nearly 300 percent price increase for previously contracted
equipment) and seemingly with Kissinger's blessing. 194 Northrop's president was able to
convince the Shah to write a letter to the Pentagon specifically requesting the F-18L
aircraft for Iran's Air Force, "... in order to put pressure on the Pentagon to decide to
produce the F-l 8 for the U.S. Navy." 195 This request was denied by the Carter
administration, but illustrates the power that aerospace companies assumed that the Shah
possessed. In essence, an order from the Shah was an assurance that a weapons system
could be produced cheaply enough to be viable; more important, an order from the Shah
was almost a necessity for production to start on new aircraft models.
Just as there is evidence of United States-Iran government-level cooperation in
raising oil prices to pay for arms, the same pattern emerges with Saudi Arabia. As early
as 1972, Ahmed Zaki Yamani, the Saudi oil minister, suggested a quidpro quo
agreement between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. Based on Aramco projections of
increased Saudi oil production (from 8 MBD in 1972 to 20 MBD by 1980)' 96 and U.S.
dependence on oil imports (the nation would require 8-10 MBD of imported oil by 1980),
Yamani suggested that favorable Saudi investment of oil profits, as well as production
194 Alam, The Shah and I, 505-507. Alam's diary recounts the Shah's dismay
over Kissinger's ostensible blessing of a price increase from $6.5 million per aircraft (F-
16) to $18 million; and the Pentagon's insistence on a price increase from $280 million to
$600 million for purchase of Spruance-class destroyers.
195 Pierre, The Global Politics ofArms Sales, 49.
196 Leonard Mosley, Power Play: Oil in the Middle East (New York: Random
House, 1973), 414.
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quotas, might be based on a change in U.S. policy toward Israel. This subtle hint was
seemingly ignored.
However, when their tactic shifted to implied threats, the Saudis found a much
more receptive audience in the United States. 197 Hints about the possible use of an Arab
"oil weapon" multiplied from April 1973. That month, Foreign Affairs featured an article
by James E. Akins, chief energy specialist in the State Department (and later Ambassador
to Saudi Arabia) on loan to the White House, entitled "The Oil Crisis: This Time the
Wolf is Here." An adaptation of a secret report he had prepared for the White House and
which had been effectively ridiculed, it gave a comprehensive analysis of the recent
forces in the global oil market: vast Gulf oil reserves, declining American production and
mounting imports, a radical and increasingly unified OPEC, the necessity for concerted
action by consumer governments (a position which had changed since his role in the
Irwin mission, evidently) to develop alternative sources of energy. His ideas were met
with skepticism. "Conservatism is not the Republican ethic," John Ehrlichman told him.
Akins also speculated on the likelihood of Arab countries imposing an oil "boycott" if the
Arab-Israeli problem was "not solved" by the late 1970s and went on to sketch a grim
picture of the "difficult and limited choices" with which this would leave the United
States: "We could try to break the boycott through military means, i.e., war; we could
197 Daniel Yergin, The Prize. Much of the discussion of OPEC's oil
machinations is taken from this masterful work, especially Chapter 29, "The Oil
Weapon," 588-613.
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accede to the wishes of the oil suppliers; or we could accept what would surely be severe
damage to our economy, possibly amounting to collapse."
On May 15, the twenty-fifth anniversary of Israel's independence, oil workers in
Libya, Iraq, Algeria, and Kuwait protested by cutting the flow of oil for part of the day.
That same month, Qaddafi abruptly halted the Libyan production of the Bunker Hunt oil
company because the United States deserved (as he chose to put it) "... a strong hard slap
on [its] cool arrogant face." 198 Further, on two different occasions in May 1973, King
Faisal of Saudi Arabia personally met with Aramco executives to impress on them that
"... time is running out with regard to U.S. interests in the Middle East, as well as the
Saudi position in the Arab world." He warned them that "You will lose everything," but
he also explained that "... a simple disavowal of Israeli policies and actions" by
Washington "... would go a long way toward overcoming the current anti-American
feeling." 199 Aramco's parent companies took pains to relay the king's warnings both to
Washington and to the American public. Mobil took out an ad in the New York Times on
June 2 1 warning that "political considerations" might dominate future Saudi decisions on
oil and the time therefore had come "... for the world to insist on a settlement in the
Middle East." The chairman of Standard of California on August 2 went to the length of
sending a letter to the company's 300,000 stockholders and employees, stressing
America's growing future dependence on Arab oil imports and appealing for
198 Wilkins, "The Oil Companies in Perspective," 72.
199 Yergin, The Prize, 595-596.
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"... understanding on our part of the aspirations of the Arab people and more positive
support of their efforts toward peace in the Middle East." Standard's ploy backfired:
California consumers initiated a boycott against its Chevron stations, and Standard was
forced to withdraw the ads.200 Later that month, Sheikh Yamani warned Aramco more
specifically that its November production might be held to seven rather than nine million
barrels a day.
Thus, long before the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the oil producers had given notice
that the status quo was insufficient. U.S. government inaction is hard to explain given
these warnings; especially as heretofore the U.S. government had taken quite a hard line
against the oil states, especially if they threatened to shut off oil supplies. Even Akins'
article had stated that such a threat was sufficient to justify U.S. government intervention.
Not only was the U.S. government involved in oil matters during the 1953 Iran crisis, but
it felt compelled to act in 1971 as well due to threats of an oil cutoff.
If Arab policies leading to the Yom Kippur and "oil" wars seem transparent given
all of their warnings and symbolic saber-rattling, the American response to those events is
profoundly puzzling. Why, since the embargo's impact on the United States turned out to
be so slight (in spite of long gas lines), did American opinion react so strongly? I posit
that Nixon administration (specifically: Kissinger) policy was such that it wanted the
U.S. consumers to become inured to oil price increases; and an easy way to do this was
200 James W. McKie, "The United States," Daedalus 104:4 (Fall 1975), 81.
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by grossly overplaying the effect of a non-existent (as explained below) gas shortage. I
do not believe that Kissinger realized the repercussions of his act; later events would
show that even he would reach his limit vis a vis oil price increases.
One point to be borne in mind is that once the oil had been placed in U.S. tankers,
the OPEC nations no longer had control of the oil's distribution; i.e., Aramco's claims to
the contrary, the King of Saudi Arabia could not force them to keep oil from America's
shores. This point was made explicitly by the Shah at a Zurich news conference in
February 1975. He stated that, "When we sell our oil and fill up the tankers in our
terminal ports we do not mind and do not care where it goes."201 In essence, oil company
officials made the unilateral decision to divert oil to other countries rather than to the
United States, thus heightening the illusion of a "shortage."
There is a widespread interpretation that the airlift of American arms to Israel's
Sinai front on October 14, 1973 "... directly provoked the Arab states to cut back
production and embargo the United States;" that the United States, compelled "... to
choose between ... an adequate oil supply and . . . support for Israel," forced Israel to
accept the cease-fire; and that the gasoline queues of the following winter prompted
Kissinger to work out the subsequent disengagements. This chain of inferences is almost
certainly wrong.202
201 Yonah Alexander and Allan Nanes, ed., The United States and Iran: A
Documentary History (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1980), 425.
202 Raymond Vernon, ed., The Oil Crisis (New York: Norton, 1976), 179-202.
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The timing of the price hikes is illuminating. The intense round of conferences in
the fall of 1973, significantly, was set off three weeks before the Yom Kippur War, on
September 15, when OPEC insisted on renegotiation of the 1971 Tehran agreement. (The
Tehran agreement, as described above, ostensibly was meant to hold prices at a steady, if
elevated, level for at least five years.) This was to be the purpose of the October 8
meeting, at which OPEC's "Gulf committee" (four Arab countries - Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, the Emirates, Qatar - plus Iran) confronted the companies' representatives with
their demand for a 70 percent price increase. On October 1 6 in Kuwait, the ministers
announced the increase unilaterally, and the next day the Arab oil ministers decided on
production cutbacks. The exact formula for the cutbacks and the specifics of the embargo
were announced by individual countries over the following days and weeks; in essence
there was no OPEC-wide agreement. The sequence of events would seem to reflect the
priorities: first, a price increase, not negotiated with the companies but imposed by the
governments, Arab and non-Arab alike; second, the Arab production cutbacks, which
supported the increased prices by reducing the oil available in the global export market by
about 13 percent between October and December 1973; and third, the embargo against
the United States, the Netherlands, and various other countries. The Saudis took the lead
on the first two measures but were among the last to proclaim an embargo.
As discussed, the timing on the Arab side, for one thing, does not bear out the
notion of American "provocation."
Nor does the timing on the American side support the hypothesis of oil blackmail.
86
In 1973, it took a month or more for a tanker from the Persian Gulf to reach the American
coast. Not only were October and November 1973 months of record oil imports; the oil
companies (in response to Saudi threats of an embargo) had overproduced throughout the
year, as shown in Table 9. A mild reduction of imports occurred in December - but the
full impact of the shortage was not felt until February and March 1974. If American
policy changed in October, at most it changed in anticipation of, rather than in response
to, any impact of the embargo.
TABLE 92°3
Change in Crude Oil Output, Selected Intervals, 1973
July-Dec 1973 Jan-Sept 1973
Saudi Arabia -19.5% 36.4%
Kuwait -16.1 -5.9
Abu Dhabi -12.9 30.4
Qatar -19.2 31.1
The conclusion thus suggests itself that, for key American as well as Arab policy
makers, the events of October 1 973 provided a convenient setting - perhaps a welcome
pretext - for doing what they had long wished to do in any case. It seems clear that U.S.
policy in the Gulf, which had become based almost wholly on arms sales to Iran and
203 Blair, The Control of Oil, 267. Kuwait's production drop in 1972-73 was due
to worldwide environmental concerns over its sulfur-laden oil and not to an embargo.
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Saudi Arabia, was supported by a rise in oil prices; thus it would be in Nixon's interest to
allow the Gulf states to raise their prices.
As Nadav Safran, an authority on Saudi Arabia, points out, there was a harmonic
convergence of oil price hikes and U.S.-Saudi defense planning. Safran reiterates that,
"The [defense planning] effort was undertaken not when the change in the strategic
environment seemed to call for it, but when funds and political opportunity made it
possible."204 Nor were the Saudis averse to the actual outcome of the U.S. military
modernization efforts: "[The efforts] were, if realized, sufficient to endow the kingdom
with a capability for offensive missions against weaker neighbors and could contribute
substantially to an Arab military coalition against Israel."205 These do not seem
consistent with traditional U.S. policy aims in the Gulf.
Robert Litwak, on the other hand, disavows this theory, arguing that U.S. arms
agreements with the Shah prior to 1973-1974 prove that a "congruence of geo-strategic
perspective" was the driving factor in arming the Shah, not a desire for arms sales.206
Based on the evidence of oil price-fixing and a need to save U.S. arms manufacturers
from a rapid decline in defense sales, I disagree; in fact, I see the two objectives as
complementary.
204 Nadav Safran, Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Questfor Security (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1985), 209.
205 Safran, Saudi Arabia, 209.
206 Robert S. Litwak, Detente and the Nixon Doctrine (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1984), 42.
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D. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
This decisive change in U.S. security assistance, with its new dependence on arms
sales and the resultant deemphasis of economic development or civic action, seemed the
perfect fix. In the short term it resulted in a stable regional order, an interventive pro-
Western power, and continued access to oil.
In the long term, however, certain cracks appeared. First, the Iranian armed forces
faced the high-tech, low-capability force dilemma. In essence, they could not utilize the
vast armament at their disposal. Second, there was widespread societal discontent with
the Shah's huge defense expenditures in light of his lack of domestic reform. This was
manifest in several arenas. Finally, the unconditional delivery of U.S. arms to the Shah
put the United States in the unenviable position of seeming to favor a personality (the
Shah) and not a nation (Iran). This would resonate at the end of the 1970s.
Despite the fact that the Carter administration attempted to curb arms sales to Iran,
the die was cast, and a self-destructive system in place. This program had several
shortcomings. First was the shortage of manpower, both to use the weapons acquired and
to maintain and repair them. Weapons ordered in 1973 and 1974 began arriving at an
ever-increasing pace in the mid-1970s, placing enormous strain on Iran's technical
support infrastructure. Columnist Jack Anderson noted in 1975 that, "Mountains of
89
munitions are piling up in Iranian docks and fields. Planes, helicopters and other
sophisticated weapons are left in crates for weeks, waiting to be assembled."207
It was also clear that Iran was unable to absorb the sophisticated weaponry it was
being sold. At one point, even the Chief of the Iranian Air Force admitted that Iran
possessed more aircraft than they could possibly use; they were short of pilots and lacked
the facilities to train more.208 The Shah was attempting to create a modern military in a
country that still lacked the technical, industrial, and educational base to do so. Further,
this required large numbers of trained personnel capable of operating, maintaining, and
servicing highly complex weapons, as well as the extensive logistics systems and support
operations that must accompany such arms. Less than half of Iran's population was
literate, and there were comparatively few persons with experience in handling
technology.209
Furthermore, the forces detailed to handle these technical weapons did not cut an
impressive figure. According to Anthony Parsons, British Ambassador to Iran:
"Boneheaded stupidity was not uncommon in the higher ranks" while he described the
private soldiers as "Central Asian peasants."210 As early as 1973, a Department of
207 Klare, American Arms Supermarket, 122.
208 Alam, The Shah and I, 390.
209 Pierre, The Global Politics ofArms Sales, 152.
210 Anthony Parsons, The Pride and the Fall: Iran 1974-1979 (London:
Jonathan Cape, 1984), 33.
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Defense assessment termed the Iranian build-up as "superficial," falling ". . . outside and
far in advance of the Iranian industrial base." Further, it concluded that "by 1978, Iran's
military machine may actually turn out to be a 'parade ground army' - physically
impressive but incapable of prolonged military action." 21 ] Asadollah Alam recounts
several military exercises which were designed to flaunt Iranian military power but ended
in abject failure before the Shah's eyes.212
This was not the merely an American observation: Michael Brzoska observes
that, "The perception of low Iranian military preparedness was a major factor behind the
Iraqi decision to attack [in 1980].
"
213 Although the dichotomy between equipment on
hand and military capability was and remains more prominent in the Saudi context, the
Shah recognized it as well. His solution was to hire Americans as technicians and to host
a military training mission in Iran. Although figures vary, between 35-60,000 Americans
lived in Iran, with about 25,000 associated with the Iranian armed forces. There was a
social cost to this, as the affluent Westerners contrasted quite starkly with the financially
beleaguered populace. More ominous, from a long-term security standpoint, the Shah's
recruitment policies provoked the alienation ofjunior officers, cadets, and technicians
who found themselves under the defacto supervision of foreigners. Considering that the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee found "... it is unlikely that Iran could go to war
211 Palmer, On Course to Desert Storm, 80.
212 Alam, The Shah and I, 252-253.
2,3 Brzoska and Ohlson, Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1971-1985, 18.
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. . . without U.S. support on a day-to-day basis," one can appreciate the humiliation and
resentment that Iran's fiercely nationalistic young officers must have felt when ordered to
obey the instructions of American civilians. Indeed, the Shah's arms program began to
cause profound divisions in the Iranian military - once viewed as a monolithic prop to the
regime.214
A second, and more immediate problem was the societal resentment caused by the
Shah's defense spending. The oil glut of the mid-1970s caused 30 percent inflation but
brought no change to the Shah's policy. With 25 percent of the budget being spent on
defense, the opportunity costs in terms of development and infrastructure projects forgone
were considerable. Spending on weapons led to the curtailment of construction at home,
which contributed to unemployment. It also led to corruption, which fueled social
frustration and public discontent. By 1978 every class of society had its grievances. The
military was unpopular, for it was taking full advantage of a privileged place in Iranian
society. The expected benefits of modernization, such as better housing, health services,
and education were insufficient and were being very unequally distributed. In 1975, for
example, illiteracy was 50 percent in Iran versus 40 percent in Tanzania. Life expectancy
was 52 years in Iran compared with 51 in India and 60 years in Turkey.215 This helped
fan the religious reaction against modernization.216
214 Klare, American Arms Supermarket, 123.
215 Mam, The Shah and I, 2\.
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Although one cannot lay the entire blame for the Iranian revolution on U.S. arms
policy, one can see that long-term stability was sacrificed for short-term goals; and that
unintended consequences resulted from the single-minded pursuit of arm sales to the




Saudi Arabia has always posed a dilemma to U.S. policy-makers. As large as the
eastern United States, it possesses long coastlines along the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, as
well as 26 percent of world oil reserves. At the same time, its small population (only 8
million in 1995) and unwillingness to base Western troops on Saudi soil have hampered
U.S. attempts to give meaningful assistance to the kingdom, or to gain meaningful
assistance from it.
As early as 1952, President Truman approved the United States Military Training
Mission (USMTM) to Saudi Arabia with a charter to create a modern army.217 In a
typical attempt to curry favor with stronger Arab states (a trend toward appeasement
which continues in modified form today), King Saud invited an Egyptian training mission
to assist the Americans.218 This was due almost entirely to a fear that Nasser might
become offended by a U.S.-only presence in Saudi Arabia, and might attempt to use force
against the kingdom. The unintended result was to allow Nasserite philosophy into the
armed forces, and several coup attempts by Saudi officers were thwarted in 1955, 1957,
1958, and 1959.
At the same time, U.S. officers were driven to distraction by the lack of Saudi
217 Safran, Saudi Arabia, 103.
218 Mordechai Abir, Saudi Arabia in the Oil Era (Boulder: Westview Press,
1988), 77.
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capabilities219 and Saud's fear of Nasserite plots. Saud's ouster and Faisal's rise to power
were accompanied by a halt of U.S. military aid in an attempt to appease Nasser; the
lesson seems not to have been learned.
The protracted war in Yemen brought Saudi Arabia back to Western arms
(literally and figuratively); Egyptian bombings of southern Saudi cities and Soviet arms
transfers to the region convinced Faisal to request U.S. assistance. This was given
primarily in the form of the unique "Engineer Assistance Agreement" formalized in 1965.
This agreement is one reason for the large Foreign Military Sales figures to Saudi Arabia
in the early 1 970s, but it was (and remains) an ingenious method for generating defense
revenues without selling weapons. From 1965 to the present, the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers has built over $15 billion worth of military and civilian facilities in Saudi
Arabia.220
These facilities, situated in strategic locations throughout the kingdom, were built
not to house Saudi forces (the King Khalid Military City has a 50,000-person capacity,
larger than the entire Saudi armed forces when it was completed), but Western ones, and
specifically American forces. The infrastructure is compatible with American equipment
and communications gear, not with gear which the Saudis possessed at the time. This
"overbuilding program" 221 could satisfy all parties: it kept U.S. troops out of the
219 Safran, Saudi Arabia, 104-105.
220 Hartung, And Weaponsfor All, 214.
221 Safran, Saudi Arabia, 154.
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kingdom; it garnered oil monies without selling advanced arms to Saudi Arabia; and it
allowed for advanced U.S. bases whose presence remained relatively unknown to the
American or Saudi public. This was combined with the Army Mobility Program, which
sold over 10,000 vehicles to the Saudi Army at a cost in excess of $150 million.
A. THE NIXON DOCTRINE AND SAUDI ARABIA
As the second of Nixon's twin pillars, Saudi Arabia was in some ways a
compromise choice: although ineffective as a military power (and thus unable to stop any
unfriendly forces from invading the Gulf or Peninsula), it was geopolitically important.
Not only did it contain vast oil wealth, but its government, although anti-Israel, was also
anti-Communist.
In fact, whereas other Arab states feverishly increased weapons purchases and
military expenditures from 1 967 to 1 970, the Saudis did less to build up their military
power after the Six-Day War than at any other time.222 This was due to a great revenue
slump, when annual growth reached only 6 percent compared to 20 percent from 1962-
1966.
However, in 1970 a U.S. mission under Major General O.A. Leahey was sent to
Saudi Arabia to address concerns resulting from Britain's impending withdrawal from the
Gulf. Oddly, the Saudis specifically excluded their Army and National Guard from
222 Safran, Saudi Arabia, 203.
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Leahey's purview: this may have been because the Saudis were secretly planning to
equip their ground forces with French armor, which they did in 1973.223
Unlike the Iranian case, where the Shah demanded and received large amounts of
U.S. weaponry in 1971 and 1972, early U.S. arms transfers to Saudi Arabia were
relatively insignificant; aside from a large shipment of 55 F-5Bs (the Foreign Military
Sales aircraft of choice) in 1971, and a renewal of the Engineer Agreement in 1972, the
Nixon Doctrine had little initial effect in Saudi Arabia. In fact, Saudi Arabia posed more
contradictions to the United States than did Iran, despite Iran's spectacular failure.
Examined in the light of U.S. interests in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia seemed inimical
to most of them.
What had more of an effect on Saudi Arabia was the regional arms race fueled by
the Nixon Doctrine (see Table 10). The build-up of the Iranian armed forces became a
concern to the Saudis as well as the Iraqis. While Iraq turned to the Soviet Union for
arms, Saudi Arabia was unwilling to do so. It therefore began large scale purchases from
the United States; military purchases rose from $15 million in 1971 to $6 billion in 1975.
223 Safran, Saudi Arabia, 198.
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TABLE 10224
Iranian and Iraqi Arms Imports, 1969-1978












As shown in Table 1 1 , Saudi defense spending did not begin to surge until 1 974,
although interestingly Saudi oil revenue had increased by 69 percent in 1971 and around
50 percent in 1972 and 1973.
224 Palmer, On Course to Desert Storm, 78.
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Table ll 225
Saudi Military Imports and Spending








1973 2,287 13.2 17.5
1974 4,729 10.9 34.7
1975 10,587 17.4 34.1
1976 14,483 19.1 35.5
1977 13,797 15.3 25.3
1978 14,523 15.9 29.0
1979 17,230 18.1 27.3
1980 19,140 14.4 26.7
1981 21,501 12.9 28.1
1982 24,159 15.7 27.7
1983 26,088 24.3 29.6
In another example of noteworthy timing, in December 1973 (the height of the
embargo), the Saudi Ministry of Defense approached the Defense Department and
requested assistance on a five to ten-year modernization program for its Air Force.
Incredibly, DOD agreed on the condition that it be broadened to a comprehensive survey
for Saudi defense needs over a ten-year period. The Saudis assented, but insisted that the
National Guard be placed under a separate survey.
225 Anthony Cordesman, Western Strategic Interests in Saudi Arabia (London:
CroomHelm, 1987), 127.
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This report, presumably still classified as it does not appear in the index of
unclassified documents, saw little external threat to Saudi Arabia, but upon Saudi
"insistence" made recommendations to cover that contingency. The modernization
program entailed an increase in army strength from 45,000 to 72,000; the Air Force from
14,000 to 22,000; the Navy from 300 to 3900; and the National Guard to remain at
35,000. What would increase at a greater rate would be firepower: the Army would gain
two armored brigades, four mechanized brigades, one airborne and one air-assault
brigade, all equipped with U.S. gear, some of it contracted for directly with U.S.
companies.226
The costs of arming the ground and air forces and creating a navy would run into
the billions of dollars: the cost of furnishing the offices was over $1 billion.
Perhaps the most controversial project was the March 1973 program called Office
of Program Management-Saudi Arabian National Guard (OPM-SANG), which was to
modernize the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG). In order to lighten the load on the
U.S. Military Training Mission (as well as keep U.S. troops out of the area), OPM-SANG
was contracted to the Vinnel Corporation, a private firm. It was projected to cost $335
million and last for four years. By 1976 total costs had escalated to $1 .9 billion; the
project continues to this day.227
226 Safran, Saudi Arabia, 206.
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Since the National Guard had the explicit mission of internal security, especially
the oil fields, could this have been a precaution taken for a planned oil shock? Perhaps
the Saudis feared a Western attempt to seize their oil facilities, or at least sabotage them
when oil prices rose or oil supplies fell. Kuwait, for one, mentioned this, as did Saudi
Arabia.
B. STABILIZATION OF THE REGION
As a surrogate force in the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia was (unlike Iran), and
remains, incapable of defending its frontiers or projecting power abroad. Its lack of
population, primitive army and aversion to Western troops on its soil made it an odd
choice as a stabilizing force. Further, the 1974 U.S. Military Commission which studied
the Saudi defense situation considered invasion of the Saudi mainland unlikely; but its
forecast posited a situation where if Iraq invaded, Saudi forces would fight a holding
action until Iranian forces could arrive, and that Iranian forces would hold until U.S.
forces could move into the area and fight the decisive war. This passage puts each nation
into its prospective place vis a vis the surrogate strategy: Saudi Arabia was incapable of
little more than slowing an incompetent attacker: Iran would provide the cannon fodder
to actually hold the attacker in place, at which point the pre-built base facilities would
allow the United States to occupy Saudi soil and counter-attack.
Once the Shah fell, support for Saudi Arabia necessitated a break with the Nixon
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Doctrine by definition, since U.S. forces were the only option to stopping a hostile power
in the Gulf. I see this as another example which shows the Doctrine to be mere
sloganeering for an arms sale policy. Thus, the need to equip the Saudis with a
preponderance of weaponry was at best stop-gap and at worst using the Saudis as a "fire
and forget" weapon until real forces could arrive. The Saudi connection was thus not
effective in containing a hostile power in the Gulf.
As for the continued existence of Israel, the Saudis were decidedly lukewarm.
Unlike the Iranians, who maintained a relationship (albeit relatively unpublicized) with
Israel, the Saudis discreetly supported the "front-line" Arab states in their struggle with
Israel. In fact, Saudi Arabia quietly undermined U.S. mediation efforts in the region.
Thus, one can rule out Saudi support for the peace process as a benefit of the Nixon
Doctrine.
C. DEVIATION FROM THE NIXON DOCTRINE: THE LAST PILLAR
STANDING
The most important change in U.S.-Saudi relations occurred in 1979, after Iran's
Islamic revolution. As the other "twin pillar," Saudi Arabia had tacitly allowed Iran
control of the Gulf while taking "responsibility" for the defense of the peninsular Gulf
States. The destabilizing effect of the Iranian revolution manifested itself in Shiite
revolts in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province; at the same time an explicitly
hostile Iran seemed to highlight Saudi Arabia's inability to defend itself.
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The strain between Iran and its smaller neighbors evoked parallel but competing
responses from Iraq and Saudi Arabia; in September 1979, the Iraqi Defense Minister
visited Bahrain and Kuwait and assured them of Iraqi protection from any "external
party."228 A week later the Saudis upped the protection ante, deploying two brigades to
Bahrain while Iran conducted large scale exercises in the Gulf; this was followed two
months later by Saudi Arabia's announcement of plans to build a causeway between the
Saudi mainland and Bahrain. This pattern continues today.
The Iranian Revolution, combined with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,
changed the tacit weapons-for-oil mercantile relationship to a defacto strategic
partnership between Saudi Arabia and the West. Saudi Arabia became dependent on
Western military equipment and advice for the modernization of its forces, as well as an
over-the-horizon presence of U.S. forces to deter an attack from the Soviet Union, Iran, or
Iraq. At the same time, the United States needed the specially-constructed Saudi Arabian
facilities to assist in any major regional interventions; Diego Garcia, the closest U.S.
support facility is as far from the Gulf as is Dublin, Ireland.
Part of this policy shift entailed a new military role in the Gulf for Saudi Arabia.
When the Ayatollah Khomeini took power, he canceled all outstanding arms agreements
with the United States. This amounted to about $8-10 billion worth of advanced arms
228 Safran, Saudi Arabia, 356.
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under production; just as important were the billions of dollars of future orders upon
which the arms industry had grown to depend.
In response, President Jimmy Carter ordered the Secretary of Defense to
overcome the crisis as quickly as possible; Secretary Harold Brown ordered
manufacturers to continue production (in part fueled by $500 million of Iranian money
which remained in the Foreign Military Sales trust fund) while he searched for buyers.
First, the U.S. military was allowed to bid upon what it desired in what columnist Jack
Anderson called "the Great Iranian Fire Sale." 229 Then, Brown went abroad. He
convinced Israel to take over Iran's F-16 program; next, accompanied by Lt. Gen. Ernest
Graves of the Defense Security Assistance Agency, he visited Saudi Arabia, Jordan and
Egypt.
Riyadh was his first stop. Here, Brown effectively changed U.S. policy in the
Gulf, suggesting that Saudi Arabia take over some of Iran's peacekeeping functions in the
region in return for additional arms and military assistance. This role was not to include
containment of Soviet or Iranian threats (which would remain the U.S. role) but a ". . .
more modest role in combating local insurgencies and tribal conflicts that could threaten
the oil flow."230 This killed two birds with one stone: it propped up the regime by
229 Klare, American Arms Supermarket, 135.
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making the SANG an arm of U.S. foreign policy; and it provided for even greater arms
sales to Saudi Arabia, in part to make up for the loss of Iranian markets.
The Saudis eagerly accepted; their condition, much like that of Iran in 1971, was
that the U.S. give them more offensive capability. Their wish list included upgrades to
their as-yet-undelivered F-15s to include air-to-air missile packages and bomb racks;
aerial tankers; and the controversial AWACS capability. 231 Brown made no firm deals
then, but a few months later the formal requests from Saudi Arabia poured in.
What was agreed upon was even stranger: the Saudis demanded, and received,
the right to finance sales of advanced arms to the Sudan (a $188 million aircraft deal),
North Yemen ($353 million for aircraft, 60 M60 tanks and 50 Ml 13 APCs) and Jordan.
In essence, the Saudis were able to use oil money to dictate U.S. policy in the Middle
East (though not against U.S. wishes); the United States would equip Saudi internal
security forces, would act militarily to protect the kingdom's external security, and would
sell weapons based on Saudi terms to parties of the Saudis' choosing.232 This echoed an
earlier arms deal, where Saudi Arabia promised $300 million for Hawk missile batteries
in Jordan, but balked when they realized that it would cost extra to maintain them. Saudi
Arabia put subtle pressure on the United States by reneging on the deal but promising the
Jordanians a $300 million credit for Soviet missiles; the United States appears to have
23
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bowed to Saudi and Iranian pressure to give the arms to Jordan.233 This was the genesis
of the Pax Saudica, a policy which still has repercussions today.
One of the other U.S. overtures was rebuffed, however, when Brown proposed the
establishment of a U.S. base and explicit security guarantees for Saudi Arabia. This the
Saudis refused in favor of immediate acquisition of offensive armaments, a deal which
Brown had already rejected. The Saudis countered by signing a defense agreement with
Iraq, while still ordering weapons from the United States.
In spite of U.S. efforts, the 1980s merely highlighted Saudi and GCC
helplessness; despite an inordinate amount of defense expenditures by the Saudis (rising
to 46.3 percent of government expenditures in 1987), Western intervention and direct
U.S. military action was necessary to maintain oil flows during the "Tanker War" of
1987-1988. In effect, arms transfers to Saudi Arabia failed to stabilize the region, as Iran
was able to threaten the Gulf states, who went so far as to request Soviet protection. In
effect, U.S. policy geared specifically to Soviet containment drove the Arab oil states into
the Soviets' arms. And the lack of a direct threat to the kingdom made stationing U.S.
troops in the ready-built bases unfeasible.
Increased deployments and unpublicized U.S. -Iraqi cooperation, begun in the
early 1980s, reflected the recognition that Saudi Arabia was an unsuitable surrogate, and
that Iran now needed to be contained. The argument can be made that U.S. support for
233 Alam, The Shah and I, 474.
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Iraq led it to believe that it could take over as a "surrogate" in the region, and continue the
earlier Iranian trend of forcibly staking its claims to disputed territories.
The necessity for Operations Desert Shield/Storm reinforced the fact that the GCC
states remained helpless in the face of even semi-professional armies. The operation is
too well-known to rehash, but its repercussions are pertinent.
In an emotional climate similar to post- 1967 Egypt, after Desert Storm the GCC
states (primarily the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait) went on a frenzied weapons
buying spree in order to ensure that history would not repeat itself; this mindset received
Western and U.S. support which continues to the present.
At this juncture it is appropriate to discuss the benefits which the United States
thought would accrue from its support of Saudi Arabia. As shown from the Iranian case
study, the short-term benefits are often stupendous; it could be argued that, in fact, they
outweigh any long-term deleterious effects.
1. If examined in the light of U.S. interests - i.e., Israel, oil, containment - the
balance sheet is favorable toward U.S. military assistance policy to Saudi Arabia. Unlike
the early 1970s, where the Saudis had to fear the radical Arab states and their Soviet
sponsor, the Saudis have become a leader in the Arab world due to their oil wealth; at the
same time their dependence on the U.S. for defense has made them much more pliable in
supporting U.S. overtures in the region. Further, Iran's support of Shii movements makes
it easy for the Saudis to adopt a conciliatory stance toward Israel since Iran presents a
more immediate existential and economic threat.
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2. Since as early as 1965, and explicitly in 1974, the U.S. has known that Saudi
arms could not contain forces hostile to U.S. interests in the Gulf; in fact, the best that
could be hoped is that Saudi forces would act as a "speed bump" in front of invading
armies. Even this modest goal has been unobtainable; as the Earnest Will missions of
1987-1989 and Desert Shield/Storm showed, Saudi Arabia is better utilized as an
advanced base than as a defensive arm. But as an advanced base it is virtually
unparalleled; both the naval and ground facilities are first-rate and strategically located.
U.S. arms transfer policy has cemented a relationship with an exceptionally important
ally, and given us a foothold in the region from which to protect our interests. In essence,
the Saudis are a fundamental part of U.S. containment strategy.
3. The Saudis' moderation of their oil policy has been, in no small part, the result
of the U.S. willingness to supply them with arms. There is no mistaking the benefit of
having a close alliance with such a powerful partner in OPEC; on numerous occasions the
Saudis have either increased production or refused to raise prices in order to ensure
continued good relations with the West. This was, and remains, Ambassador Akins'
argument. In Operations Earnest Will and Desert Shield/Storm, the Saudis provided over
$17 billion in direct and indirect aid to U.S. forces, as well as paying other expenses,
further highlighting U.S.-Saudi interdependence. Therefore, in maintaining oil flows
from the Gulf, U.S. arms transfer policy has succeeded. The Saudi regime has not fallen,
oil prices remain affordable, and U.S. power is paramount in the region.
4. Furthermore, the United States has battle-proven and highly desirable weapons
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systems. U.S. government procurement of defensive technologies has fallen from $118
billion in 1990 to $50 billion in 1997; up to 2.5 million experienced defense workers will
have been laid off by the year 2001
.
234 Therefore, it is imperative for national security
that arms transfers continue both to maintain a viable Defense Technological and
Industrial Base in case of future wars, and to save American jobs; balance of payment
issues are also important. Consequently, one could rightfully ask, on what grounds
would U.S. arms transfer policy lead to long-term instability?
234 William J. DelGrego, The Diffusion ofMilitary Technologies to Foreign
Nations (Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 1996), 3-4.
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VI. REPERCUSSIONS AND POLICY OPTIONS
As discussed, the ramifications of wanton arms sales are manifold, and especially
in regards to Saudi Arabia. As in Iran, the unfettered sale of arms to Saudi Arabia has
created a weapons-rich, but small and relatively inept force. The Saudi Army has shown
itself incapable of defending the kingdom: this inability has necessitated the permanent
basing of U.S. Army and Air Force troops in the kingdom to defend against possible Iraqi
incursions. The U.S. presence has become perhaps the greatest threat to the Saudi
regime, enraging religious conservatives and liberals alike; U.S. troops have served as a
rhetorical focal point and literal target for Saudi dissident groups.235
Furthermore, attempts to absorb the great amounts of U.S. weaponry now in the
Saudi forces have pointed out the possible need to institute conscription; the suggestion
alone, made publicly on several occasions by King Fahd,236 was controversial. If
implemented, which is doubtful, it would create social discord both among the Sunnite
population which is at best lukewarm about military service, and the underemployed
Shiites who are not allowed to serve.237
235 Numerous media sources, to include Mideast Mirror (14 August 1995, 16
August 1995, 15 November 1995) and The Independent (8 February 1996).
236 Peter W. Wilson and Douglas F. Graham, Saudi Arabia: The Coming Storm
(Amronk,NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), 165.
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Secondly, recent media reports have highlighted a deteriorating domestic situation
in the kingdom,238 especially the Eastern Province. Despite a fall in oil revenues, defense
expenditures remain high while entitlements (subsidies for private business and
guaranteed government jobs, for example) have been reduced. Hints that an income tax
might be levied were not well-received; one of the unspoken fundaments of Saudi society
is the acceptance of "no representation as long as there is no taxation."
At the same time, and perhaps more important in breeding instability, is the
intraregional arms race which has been fueled by U.S. policies and that said policies
presently exacerbate. As discussed, the arming of the Shah begat an Iran-Iraq arms race,
as well as the fall of the Shah. The Iran-Iraq War dragged on in part due to continued
arms sales to the actors who made up in fanaticism what they lacked in ability, and only
U.S. intervention maintained vital oil flows. The U.S. intervention encouraged Iraq in its
designs, however, and helped beget the invasion of Kuwait, and only massive
international intervention stopped Iraq and saved Kuwait.
The lesson that the GCC states have learned is the wrong one: they have ignored
the high-tech low-capability reality and become enamored of the idea that weapons per se
bring security. They have also learned that a bigger army in the neighboring state is a
source of insecurity : and thus they must scramble to keep up, in the classic self-
perpetuating cycle. This cycle has proven to be deeply destabilizing for the regimes who
238 Kechichian, Political Dynamics, 42-45.
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are supposed to be helped; and the short-term fix of selling more arms to ensure parity
collides with the long-term needs for infrastructure building, education and enlargement
of democratic institutions. A sense of nationality and a stake in the political process for
its citizenry will give the Gulf states more security than U.S. arms transfers alone.
This arms race is counterproductive for U.S. interests and regional stability. First,
none of the GCC states can stand up to an Iraqi or Iranian attack. Thus, large military
expenditures are an absolute waste for these nations. For several of the oil states, a
program of development and economic expansion might be a better road to security in
anticipation of the oil one day running out. Second, the overwhelming strength of the
Saudi forces vis a vis the GCC gives the smaller states pause for thought:239 explicit U.S.
support for the Saudi regime gives the illusion that the United States will approve
virtually any course of action that the kingdom takes. Saudi Arabia presently has border
or mineral disputes with Yemen, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, and Bahrain. In fact, a recent
study states that:
Not one of the states of the Arabian Peninsula recognized
by the international community, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia,
Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Oman and
Yemen could put up a watertight case to the International
court at the Hague to retain the territory it actually
occupies. Each one of their boundaries could be
challenged, in whole or in part, by its neighbour or a third
party.240
239 Kechichian, Political Dynamics, 43.
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Any of these could be quickly solved by Saudi arms, and the smaller states realize this.
By the same token, U.S. acceptance of large standing forces gives tacit approval (as it did
to Iraq on several occasions) to solve matters unilaterally; this violent solution by
definition will have a deadly outcome, and may draw the U.S. unwittingly into
intraregional disputes. In fact, U.S. policy increases the chances of this by arming states
who would otherwise traditionally turn to mediation.
One aspect of U.S. arms transfers to the Gulf that is disturbing and that may have
unpleasant ramifications, is support for repressive regimes. It is well-known that most
governments in the region are autocratic; furthermore, a large proportion of arms which
go to these states are utilized by internal security forces to put down dissent. Although
the Saudi Arabian National Guard is the most egregious example, Bahrain has also used
armed forces to quell internal disturbances. Although the use of arms transfers to keep a
friendly regime in power seems fruitful, supplying repression carries a heavy price in
popular ill will if the regime ever falls. And since monarchs utilize armies for the
primary purpose of regime survival, the U.S. support becomes personalized.
Counterfactually, I posit an even more interesting scenario; recent reports have it
that the Caspian basin may contain more oil than the Middle East (though more sober
observers equate its capacity with a mid-level OPEC producer such as Kuwait).241 At the
same time, oil reserves in the Gulf region are dwindling. If the Persian Gulf region
begins to lose market share, each individual country may find it in their interest not only
241 Telephone interview with Manucher Farmanfarmaian, 5 November 1997.
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to defend their own oil shipments but to economically or militarily attack the other states.
Iran or Oman may find it in their interest to control shipping routes. There is a possibility
that a pitched battle for the Strait of Hormuz, followed by a neo-Tanker War, could result.
All of the Gulf states have the wherewithal to conduct air attacks on unarmed merchant
vessels.
With this in mind, a change in U.S. security assistance policy may be advisable.
Although the Saudi regime is a bit more stable than the Shah's was, and not as prone to
excesses, the danger exists for it to fall; further, virtually unlimited arms sales to other
states lend them little defensive capability but increase their neighbors' perceptions of
their own insecurity.
I suggest a variation on the theme presently in place. First, explicit U.S. security
guarantees should be given to all GCC states; a treaty or agreement may be worded in
such a way as to put them under a security umbrella without unduly ruffling the rather
prickly regimes in Iran, Iraq or Saudi Arabia.
A legacy of the Nixon Doctrine remains in the large Iranian and Iraqi militaries:
James Akins views the axiomatic acceptance of Iranian/Iraqi hegemony in the Gulf as the
Nixon Doctrine's most harmful byproduct.242 U.S. failure to build and maintain
consensus for its dual containment policy merely highlights the security problem which
has resulted from the development of these regional superpowers.
242 Interview with Ambassador Akins, 3 October 1997.
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The smaller Gulf states suffer from a typical peril and refuge dilemma: the United
States may be the power today, but it is prudent to stay on the good side of Iraq and Iran
just in case. As in South Asia today, where U.S. withdrawal from the Philippines and
Korea has given impetus to both an arms race and Chinese adventurism,243 the Gulf states
are put in the unenviable position of having to appease several actors.
The fear of U.S. withdrawal and consequent Iranian/Iraqi hegemony in the Gulf
must be curbed; and it cannot be curbed with increased arms sales. The Gulf is vital
enough to U.S. interests to be an explicit part of the U.S. sphere of influence; and a Pax
Americana based both on U.S.-European cooperation (as in 1987-89 and again in 1990-
91) and on explicit security guarantees to any Gulf state in case of attack, would both
ensure our friends in the area and perhaps draw our erstwhile enemies into the fold.
Second, remove U.S. troops from Saudi Arabia and utilize bases in Qatar,
Bahrain, Oman and Kuwait.
The presence of U.S. troops on Saudi soil actively works against our interests and
should be discontinued immediately. A series of bilateral agreements between the United
States and the Gulf states has given the United States a large assortment of basing rights,
prepositioned supplies and exercise opportunities.244 The enhanced U.S. ability to react
243
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quickly to Iraqi moves will more than make up for limited numbers of U.S. troops in
Saudi Arabia, where their presence has become counter-productive.
This will also have the effect of reassuring smaller Gulf states that a Pax Saudica
is not the U.S. goal; true peace and stability is. Further, greater use of non-Saudi
facilities will show that the United States is willing to guarantee everyone's security in the
region and will go far toward alleviating fears and rivalries.
Third, begin to substitute small and unobtrusive U.S. military training missions
for arms sales. At this point, absorption and maintenance of weapons systems is a greater
concern than acquisition of more.
Presently there are about 700 military trainers in the entire Gulf region.245 This
compares with the British effort in Oman, where there are roughly 300 British troops
acting as trainers. The British system has been noteworthy in its ability to create viable
armed forces; the United States should consider the long-term benefits of utilizing its
stock of foreign area officers and seasoned non-commissioned officers to create a
professional military class in the Gulf states.246 This ethos would be one of the most
245 Cordesman, U.S. Forces in the Middle East, 84.
246 Perhaps the most successful U.S. effort in the Vietnam War was the
Combined Action Platoon (CAP) program, where the U.S. Marines deployed small
twelve-man units to roughly 90 Vietnamese villages. These units lived as villagers and
patrolled with Popular Forces militia units. Both the officers and marines were forced to
become expert in the Vietnamese language and culture. No village protected by a CAP
was ever captured by Vietcong forces; this could also serve as a model for U.S. training
missions to the region. A masterful discussion of the CAP program is found in F.J. West,
The Village (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985). West was a Marine
captain who spent two years in the village of Binh Nighia commanding a CAP.
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significant legacies of the U.S. presence in the region. Further, it would be instrumental
in creating a cohesive and combat-effective Peninsular Shield Force for the Gulf
Cooperative Council by standardizing training and operations between the various states.
In addition, the number of soldiers in Gulf armies do not match the number of
weapons. By Western standards, Saudi Arabia's force structure would require 1 00,000-
150,000 men; the Saudi armed forces presently stand at around 76,000.247 Kuwait's
Army, with 8-9000 men, roughly one-half the size of its pre- 1991 force, should have
about 30,000 to man its force structure. Neither country has shown a willingness to stop
arms purchases; the United States should do everything within its power to increase
training missions on the British model and decrease arms transfers to the region.
Finally, a combination of the Fifth Fleet, Carrier Battle Groups and Amphibious
Ready Groups must aggressively patrol and show the flag in the Gulf. They can serve as
both early-warning and first-response forces at lower cost than other forces, although it
has been argued recently that U.S. deployments in the Gulf do not return good value.248
In purely monetary terms I would agree, but world preeminence is not always cost-
effective. The deterrent effect of the Carrier Battle Group and Marine Expeditionary Unit
offshore is such that short-term costs are outweighed by the long-term benefits of
preventing aggressive moves by potential hegemons in the region.
247 Anthony H. Cordesman, After the Storm: The Changing Military Balance in
the Middle East (Boulder, Colo: Westview, 1993), 570.
248 Graham E. Fuller and Ian O. Lesser, "Persian Gulf Myths," Foreign Affairs
76, no. 3 (May/June 1997): 42-53.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The Nixon Doctrine and its predecessors created a system whereby arms sales
replaced a U.S. presence in many regions; these profligate sales have led to
counterproductive arms races and even greater instability in the Persian Gulf. The history
of U.S. intervention in the region is the history of this policy's failure.
The Nixon Doctrine's roots were not in Vietnam. Rather, the Nixon Doctrine was
a premeditated policy to arm the Shah of Iran as U.S. surrogate, bypass congressional
oversight, and prop up the sagging U.S. defense industry. The Doctrine was an attempt to
balance the geo-political imperatives of Soviet containment and access to oil with the
need to satisfy domestic pressures, and it was an astute political solution in the short term.
Arming the Shah required that Iran develop a source of revenue, and the evidence
shows an explicit change in U.S. energy policy which facilitated the Shah's arms
purchases. After U.S. acquiescence to oil price hikes in 1971, there appears to be
unprecedented U.S. -Iran cooperation and encouragement in raising oil prices thereafter,
connected to an explicit agreement to sell Iran any and all conventional weapons it
wished to purchase. The concurrent changes in U.S. energy and arms transfer policy are
not coincidental; they were intimately and causally connected.
The large-scale arms transfers resulting from and associated with the twin pillars
strategy have a seductive allure in the short term, when examined in view of continued
access to oil supplies. On the other hand, U.S. arms transfers hastened the fall of the
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Shah, helped precipitate two costly wars in the region, and encourage a regional norm
wherein costly ineffective armies may someday need to prove their efficacy.
The Nixon Doctrine ultimately proved to be a failure; profligate arms sales per se
cannot bring stability. Present policy remains in large part based upon the flawed
foundations of the Nixon Doctrine, and is thus counterproductive in furthering U.S.
interests in the Gulf.
A better long-term solution is to encourage economic diversification; give
explicit security guarantees to the GCC states while attempting to contain Iraq and
engage Iran; utilize basing agreements where possible, withdraw U.S. troops from Saudi
Arabia, and put training missions in place to help reform Gulf forces; and finally, utilize
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